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LEGAL MIRRORS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
MIRIT EYAL-COHEN* 
Abstract: Small businesses are regarded as the engine of the economy. But just 
what is a “small business”? Depending on where one looks in the law, the defini-
tions vary. Routinely, though, these various classifications fail to assess the poli-
cy considerations and legislative intent for granting regulatory preferences to 
small concerns to begin with. In the last century, the U.S. government has been 
cultivating one such policy of fiscal and economic growth. Consequently, Con-
gress and private institutions have been acting to incentivize, support, and reward 
entrepreneurship through the law to stimulate the economy. Nevertheless, rather 
than targeting entrepreneurial businesses directly, the law grants preferences to 
entities according to their size, reflecting an obsolescent picture of past econo-
mies. Although most entrepreneurial firms may start small, not all small firms 
innovate and create new economic value. This Article applies “mirror theory” 
and proposes a novel legal model that strives to correlate the design of our legal 
rules, the goals they set to advance, and the societal trends they reflect. The Arti-
cle suggests replacing the current size-based approach in our laws with a model 
that measures firms’ entrepreneurial orientation. Unlike the current binary small-
or-not standard, this multi-tiered, simple, and flexible model reduces the intrinsic 
arbitrariness, complexity, and uncertainty in current legal definitions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past thirty years, there has been a growing awareness of the 
positive externalities that small businesses create in the economy.1 What is a 
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“small business”? The answer is in the eyes of the beholder. Today, definitions 
of the term “small business” vary widely throughout different areas of the law, 
and even from one section of the law to another.2 Small businesses are depict-
ed as both an engine of the American economy and as a primary source of en-
trepreneurship and innovation.3 Indeed, they have come to represent the es-
sence of the American dream and the free enterprise economic system.4 
These depictions of small business can be traced to the history of small 
firms and the way these entities have been defined by law.5 According to the 
Small Business Administration (“SBA”), “small businesses” are businesses 
with fewer than five hundred employees.6 And the SBA reports that over nine-
ty-nine percent of firms in the United States meet this definition.7 Throughout 
history, these firms have benefitted from special rules and regulatory exemp-
                                                                                                                           
of Advocacy has produced a series of annual reports on American small businesses [which provide] a 
rich collection of information about small business contributions to the economy and trends over 
time.”). See generally U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY: A REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT (2010), available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/sb_econ2010.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/P7NN-92BF (discussing the contributions small businesses make to the economy). 
 2 Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Down-Sizing the “Little Guy” Myth in Legal Definitions, 98 IOWA L. REV. 
1041, 1065–86 (2013) (surveying how small business is defined differently in securities law, health 
law, labor and employment law, patent law, government contracting law, and tax law). 
 3 See Susan M. Gates & Kristin J. Leuschner, Introduction to IN THE NAME OF ENTREPRENEUR-
SHIP? THE LOGIC AND EFFECTS OF SPECIAL REGULATORY TREATMENT FOR SMALL BUSINESS 1, 1 
(Susan M. Gates & Kristin J. Leuschner eds., 2007) (discussing the role small businesses play in the 
economy). 
 4 See 128 CONG. REC. 9177 (1982) (statement of Sen. Samuel A. Nunn, Jr.) ( “Small business is 
the heart of the free enterprise system, that sector most likely to take the steps necessary to get this 
Nation back of [sic] the road to economic recovery.”); 124 CONG. REC. 35217 (1978) (statement of 
Sen. Gaylord A. Nelson) ( “[S]mall businesses . . . are the heart and soul of the competitive free enter-
prise system.”); cf. MANSEL G. BLACKFORD, A HISTORY OF SMALL BUSINESS IN AMERICA 1 (2d ed. 
2003) (discussing the integral role small businesses play in American culture); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 537, 538 (1998) (noting that the myth that small is good and big is bad is deeply rooted in our 
cultural beliefs). See generally Frank T. Carlton, What Is Free Enterprise?, 3 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 
655, 656 (1944) (discussing the importance of free enterprise to the American dream). 
 5 See infra notes 177–238 and accompanying text (providing a history of small business in Amer-
ica). 
 6 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2012) [hereinafter U.S. SMALL 
BUS. ADMIN., FAQ], available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ_Sept_2012.pdf, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/F6Q3-49VT. Different industries may define small business differently. Id. 
(citing U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., TABLE OF SMALL BUSINESS SIZE STANDARDS MATCHED TO 
NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM CODES (2014), available at http://www.
sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Size_Standards_Table.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6ZEF-7AHP 
(listing small business size standards in numerous industries, including those ranging from agriculture 
to public administration)). 
 7 Id. (stating that 27.9 million U.S. firms qualify as small businesses, whereas only 18,500 firms 
have 500 or more employees). 
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tions solely by virtue of their size.8 When the majority of a group receives 
preferential treatment, one can only wonder whether those rules could be de-
signed more effectively. 
Our legal system is full of benefits granted to small entities.9 These bene-
fits are overinclusive, contain inconsistent and contradictory notions of firm 
size, and create data distortions.10 With over ninety-nine percent of firms meet-
ing the various definitions of small business, it is no surprise that studies find a 
positive correlation between such entities and the growth of the American 
economy.11 Given the broad nature of the small business category, legal favor-
itism of small entities results in the waste of revenues and the misallocation of 
government resources.12 This occurs because the rules governing the allocation 
of benefits focus on firm size rather than more efficient ways of promoting 
economic growth.13 This Article seeks to remedy this skewed picture of society 
by considering the role that legal rules play in reinforcing such an image. 
Legal rules that favor small entities are one instance in which the law 
provides an archaic reflection of society. The favoring of small firms began in 
a time when people feared and disliked the mounting power of big businesses 
and simultaneously appreciated small businesses as essential to a free enter-
prise system.14 This social image of small businesses, however, is very differ-
ent today. In fact, scholars have found that small businesses create negative 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 2, at 1065–85 (highlighting small business favoritism in securities 
law, health law, labor and employment law, patent law, government contracting law, and tax law). 
 9 Id. 
 10 See id. at 1095–97 (arguing that certain government programs that aim to promote entrepre-
neurship result in a waste of resources because they focus on business size). 
 11 See id. at 1095–96 (discussing studies that show a correlation between firm size and economic 
growth); U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FAQ, supra note 6, at 1 (reporting that 99.7% of U.S. employer 
firms are small businesses). Similar to the SBA’s definition of small business, the definition found in 
the Securities Act captures over 99% of firms. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2012) (describing 
“small organizations” as entities engaged in small-business financing with total assets of $5 million or 
less), with SOI Tax Stats—Corporation Source Book Statistical Tables 2008 (All Sectors), INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Corporation-Source-Book-Statistical-Tables-
2008-All-Sectors, archived at http://perma.cc/4DS3-PVS2 (last updated Apr. 26, 2013) (follow the 
“1” hyperlink located directly to the right of “U.S. Total, 2008”) (illustrating that 99.96% of firms 
meet this definition). Moreover, §§ 1045 and 1202 of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) define 
small businesses as firms with $50 million of assets or less. I.R.C. § 1045(b)(1) (2012); I.R.C. 
§ 1202(c)–(d). Currently, the Internal Revenue Service provides that 99% of all firms report $50 mil-
lion of assets or less. See SOI Tax Stats—Corporation Source Book Statistical Tables 2008 (All Sec-
tors), supra. 
 12 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 2, at 1096–97. 
 13 See id. at 1056. 
 14 See Pierce, supra note 4, at 538–39, 549–50; cf. 128 CONG. REC. 9177 (1982) (statement of 
Sen. Samuel A. Nunn, Jr.) ( “Small business is the heart of the fr ee enterprise system . . . .”). 
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externalities.15 For example, employment in small firms is generally unstable 
and unskilled.16 Further, most small businesses are “job destroyers” due to rap-
id job turnover and layoffs.17 Likewise, employment in such livelihood busi-
nesses is usually low paying and lacking in job security, benefits, and opportu-
nities for advancement.18 These observations have recently begun to shift the 
focus from small businesses’ contributions to the economy to the growth po-
tential of young entities, creating a need for further investigation of the sources 
of economic development.19 
Entrepreneurship is an essential element of economic development. Alt-
hough there is no one element that drives economic growth,20 since the nine-
teenth century, scholars have recognized the essential role of entrepreneurship 
in the development of the economy.21 Throughout the twentieth century to to-
                                                                                                                           
 15 See BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 178 (discussing the shortcomings of small business); 
CHARLES BROWN ET AL., EMPLOYERS LARGE AND SMALL 2–4 (1990); Walter Y. Oi & Todd L. Id-
son, Chapter 33: Firm Size and Wages, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2165, 2166–81 (Orley 
Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (discussing the wage gap between large and small firms); Mar-
tin A. Sullivan, When Should Small Businesses Get a Tax Break?, TAX NOTES, Jan. 16, 2012, at 267, 
268 (contending that big firms pay higher wages, provide better health and pension benefits, and have 
lower turnover than small firms). 
 16 Oi & Idson, supra note 15, at 2184, 2187–88. 
 17 See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 268. 
 18 See Oi & Idson, supra note 15, at 2204; Sullivan, supra note 15, at 268. 
 19 See BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 176–81. 
 20 See generally ROBERT J. BARRO, DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A CROSS-
COUNTRY EMPIRICAL STUDY 52–87 (1997) (examining the effect of democracy on economic 
growth); E. Borensztein et al., How Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth?, 45 J. 
INT’L ECON. 115, 115 (1998) (reporting that foreign direct investment is a factor that affects economic 
growth); Ross Levine, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, 8 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 8, 9 (1999) 
(arguing that the legal environment affects financial development and, eventually, long-run economic 
growth); Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, 88 AM. ECON. 
REV. 537, 537 (1998) (demonstrating that stock market liquidity and banking development contribute 
to economic growth); Richard R. Nelson & Edmund S. Phelps, Investment in Humans, Technological 
Diffusion, and Economic Growth, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 69, 69–70 (1966) (positing that education and 
investment in human capital is important for economic growth). 
 21 See PETER F. DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: PRACTICE AND PRINCIPLES 
21 (1985) (noting that the nineteenth century French economist Jean-Baptiste Say described entrepre-
neurs as persons who “shift[] economic resources out of an area of lower and into an area of higher 
productivity and greater yield”); FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 41 (1921) 
(stating that taking risks is the entrepreneur’s essential function in the economy); JOSEPH A. SCHUM-
PETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, 
INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 74 (1934) (describing entrepreneurship as the “fundamental 
phenomenon of economic development”); William J. Baumol, Entrepreneurship in Economic Theory, 
58 AM. ECON. REV. 64, 64–65 (1968) (contending that the entrepreneur has an important role in eco-
nomic development); Harvey Leibenstein, Entrepreneurship and Development, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 
72, 72 (1968) (arguing that entrepreneurship has a unique and critical role in the economic growth 
process). But see ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 81 (1973) (“[F]or me 
[entrepreneurship] is important primarily in enabling the market process to work itself out in all con-
texts—with the possibility of economic development seen merely as a special case.”). 
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day, there has been similar general agreement among economists and policy-
makers that entrepreneurship is a vital component in economic development.22 
The key predictor of a firm’s commercial success is entrepreneurial charac-
ter—the ability to innovate and successfully deliver innovation to the market.23 
Some scholars distinguish between small business owners and entrepre-
neurs.24 Most small traditional businesses today exist primarily to provide 
means of support to the owners and their families, not to bolster the econo-
my.25 Successful entrepreneurial entities, by contrast, take high risks by pursu-
ing novel ideas.26 When these ideas are delivered to the market successfully, 
they result in rapid and substantial wealth and labor creation.27 Despite this 
distinction, the government offers significant benefits to people who operate or 
own stock in all small firms in the name of entrepreneurship.28 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See, e.g., DAVID A. HARPER, FOUNDATIONS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT 2 (2003) (“[E]ntrepreneurship itself often generates more entrepreneurship, so that economic de-
velopment is a process that can be kept in motion by endogenous economic forces rather than exogenous 
shocks . . . .”); Martin A. Carree & A. Roy Thurik, The Impact of Entrepreneurship on Economic 
Growth, in HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY SURVEY AND IN-
TRODUCTION 437, 437 (Zoltán J. Ács & David B. Audretsch eds., 2003) (arguing that entrepreneurship is 
positively correlated with growth); Amir N. Licht, The Entrepreneurial Spirit and What the Law Can Do 
About It, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 817, 817 (2007) (noting that entrepreneurship is important to 
many desirable social outcomes, including lower unemployment, economic growth, and technological 
advancement); Sander Wennekers & Roy Thurik, Linking Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth, 13 
SMALL BUS. ECON. 27 passim (1999) (surveying the literature associating entrepreneurship with econom-
ic development); Robert J. Shiller, The Culture of Entrepreneurship, PROJECT SYNDICATE (July 25, 
2005), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-culture-of-entrepreneurship#z1pMACS0YOhV
qwP4.99, archived at http://perma.cc/G83E-V5G8 (contending that entrepreneurship is an incubator and 
essential to long-term economic success). 
 23 See Zoltán J. Ács et al., Introduction: Why Entrepreneurship Matters to ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 
GROWTH, AND PUBLIC POLICY 1, 8–9 (Zoltán J. Ács et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the importance of 
entrepreneurship to economic growth and the commercialization of innovative ideas). 
 24 James W. Carland et al., Differentiating Entrepreneurs from Small Business Owners: A Con-
ceptualization, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 354, 354 (1984) (arguing that although there is an overlap be-
tween entrepreneurial firms and small business firms, they are different entities). But see William G. 
Gale & Peter R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in the Bush Administration, 2001–
2004, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1157, 1192, 1204–06 (2004) (including small business in a discussion of pro-
entrepreneur tax cuts). 
 25 See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 267–68. 
 26 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, The Entrepreneur in Today’s Economy, in THE ENTREPRENEUR, 
CLASSIC TEXTS BY JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER 261, 261–83 (Markus C. Becker et al. eds., 2011) (ob-
serving this phenomenon in a discussion about the process of making entrepreneurial profits). 
 27 See id. 
 28 Compare I.R.C. § 1202(a)(1) (2012) (providing a tax break for noncorporate investors by ex-
cluding fifty percent of gains “from the sale or exchange of qualified small business stock”), with 157 
CONG. REC. E10–E11 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2011) (statement of Rep. David Dreier) (emphasizing the 
importance of innovation and entrepreneurship to the economy in support of tax benefits for small 
businesses). 
724 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:719 
The legal and academic discourse favoring small businesses harms entre-
preneurship. The U.S. government, through congressional small business 
committees and the SBA, reinforces the path dependency of small business 
favoritism at the expense of entrepreneurship.29 Moreover, the continuous con-
flation of small businesses and entrepreneurs in and of itself hampers entrepre-
neurship. This is because the regulatory relief that small business owners re-
ceive does not necessarily provide entrepreneurs with the support they need.30 
We must ask, then, if we acknowledge that the focus on business size in 
legal definitions is inappropriate, what alternative remains? In other words, if 
entrepreneurship is a well-known element central to the development of an 
economy, how can the law mirror it? This Article aims to answer these im-
portant questions. Because law affects societies, markets, people, and firms, it 
has the power to directly and indirectly benefit or harm the development of 
entrepreneurship.31 Accordingly, it becomes imperative to target entrepreneur-
ial entities accurately.32 To date, such efforts have proved unsuccessful. 
This Article attempts to help the law accurately target entrepreneurs by 
creating a new legal model of entrepreneurial proclivity. It proposes to replace 
certain references to small business in the law with a flexible, graduated model 
of entrepreneurial orientation. This new model relies on the insights of the 
Austrian School of Economics, which perceives the market as a process rather 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Why Is Small Business the Chief Business of Congress?, 43 RUTGERS 
L.J. 1, 8–12, 28–38 (2011) (demonstrating how certain political institutions entrenched ineffective 
legal paths by sustaining small business preferences). Path dependency is the notion that history mat-
ters and that past actions influence present decisions. 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECO-
NOMICS AND THE LAW 17–18 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). For example, a person does not change his 
housing each day in response to price changes in the market. Id. at 18. A housing choice is the result 
of a rental or purchase decision made in the past, and that past decision influences the person’s present 
decision not to move. Id. 
 30 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 29, at 34–51 (providing an example of the Small Business Invest-
ment Company program, a creation of the institutional path dependency of small business interests 
that failed to attend to the needs of entrepreneurs). 
 31 See Markus C. Becker et al., Introduction to THE ENTREPRENEUR, CLASSIC TEXTS BY JOSEPH 
A. SCHUMPETER, supra note 26, at 1, 37 (expressing a belief that social and economic policies have a 
role in harming or supporting entrepreneurship); Licht, supra note 22, at 850–61 (discussing the ef-
fects law has on entrepreneurship). 
 32 See Licht, supra note 22, at 34–51; D. Gordon Smith & Masako Ueda, Law & Entrepreneur-
ship: Do Courts Matter?, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 353, 356–57 (2006) (arguing that scholars 
should focus on studying optimal legal structures to facilitate the commercialization of entrepreneurial 
opportunities and the regulation of entrepreneurial firms); see also CRAIG K. ELWELL, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., RL32987, LONG-TERM GROWTH OF THE U.S. ECONOMY: SIGNIFICANCE, DETERMI-
NANTS, AND POLICY 15 (2006), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32987_20060525.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/AG8K-5NE3 (“This infrastructure [of economic growth] is comprised of 
laws, government policies, socio-economic institutions, and cultural attitudes that are conducive to the 
entrepreneurial activity that generates sustained long-term economic growth.”). 
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than as a configuration of prices.33 The proposed model focuses on innovation 
and economic value to set forth five factors that describe the entrepreneurial 
phenomenon: (1) the firm’s age, (2) knowledge procurement, (3) innovation 
yield, (4) labor expansion, and (5) entrepreneurial success.34 This Article 
demonstrates that the deployment of a multi-tiered legal model of entrepre-
neurship, as opposed to the current small-or-not standard, will more effectively 
promote the goals underlying small business benefits—namely, economic 
growth.35 
Part I of this Article reviews the elements of economic development theo-
ry.36 Part II then demonstrates that the current legal focus on size reflects an 
anachronistic picture of past economies and obsolete social views.37 Part III 
offers a multi-dimensional legal model of entrepreneurship, which better ac-
counts for the role of entrepreneurship in economic development.38 Part IV 
surveys the policies of the proposed model as well as possible criticisms.39 It 
also illustrates how the proposed model can be applied more efficiently by re-
placing some of the current legal size definitions.40 Lastly, Part IV highlights 
the complex dynamic between entrepreneurship and the law.41 
I. THE ELEMENTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Every practical model must be grounded in theory.42 Joseph Schumpeter, 
the most influential figure of the Austrian School of Economics, defined eco-
                                                                                                                           
 33 See ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 3–37 (1992) (explaining the differences between Austrian Eco-
nomics and other schools of economics). Adam Smith, on the other hand, argued that an invisible 
hand directs the forces of the market toward equilibrium. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS BOOKS: I–III 157–66 (Andrew S. Skinner ed., Penguin Books 1986) (1776) (discussing how the 
market reaches the natural price of a commodity). See generally infra notes 43–49 and accompanying 
text (providing a more in-depth comparison between Austrian Economics as represented by Joseph 
Schumpeter). 
 34 See infra notes 265–355 and accompanying text. 
 35 In a different project, I continue to explore the ways smaller provincial entities are actually 
beneficial to local and regional growth and the means by which the government should advance such 
entities. See generally Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Urban Mavericks (May 1, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
 36 See infra notes 42–155 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 156–264 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 265–355 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 356–388 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 356–388 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 356–388 and accompanying text. 
 42 Cf. Susan Sturm, Reaction: Law Schools, Leadership, and Change, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 
52 (2013), http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/forvol127_sturm.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/GV7Z-5YJ4 (arguing that legal education should work to break down the dichotomy 
between theory and practice); cf. also Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. 
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nomic development as a dynamic process of change.43 Schumpeter, unlike Ad-
am Smith, argued that there is no invisible hand directing the forces of the 
economy toward stability and growth.44 Instead, Schumpeter believed that the 
circular flow of economic life evolves through a process of “Creative Destruc-
tion” —cycles of punctuated equilibria disrupted by sudden leaps of endoge-
nous innovation.45 
According to Schumpeter, entrepreneurs are both the principal agents of 
Creative Destruction and the destabilizing force in the economy.46 These “eco-
nomic leaders,” as Schumpeter describes them, are avant-garde in that they 
create new combinations that confront and eventually defeat previously exist-
ing economic orders.47 These innovative new combinations destroy the basis of 
the old economy.48 And through destruction, they pave the way for a new eco-
nomic order with higher levels of prosperity and welfare.49 
This Article proposes a model of entrepreneurial proclivity. To place the 
proposed model in a proper context, this Part provides a brief overview of the 
main elements of economic development theory. First it discusses the econom-
ic concept of “novelty.”50 It then explores the relationship between value and 
entrepreneurial profits.51 This Part then explains the impact a business’s size 
has on economic development, if any.52 Finally, this Part provides an overview 
of contemporary thoughts on economic development.53 
                                                                                                                           
L. REV. 955, 955 (1984) (arguing that there is a need to develop a viable legal model of gender equali-
ty that accounts for sex differences as a key concept in modern political theory and practice). 
 43 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, The Theory of Economic Development: The Fundamental Phe-
nomenon of Economic Development, in THE ENTREPRENEUR, CLASSIC TEXTS BY JOSEPH A. SCHUM-
PETER, supra note 26, at 43, 48–49. 
 44 Compare JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, Economic Theory and Entrepreneurial History, in ESSAYS 
ON ENTREPRENEURS, INNOVATIONS, BUSINESS CYCLES, AND THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITALISM 253, 
254–55 (Richard V. Clemence ed., 1989) (calling Adam Smith’s picture of the industrial process en-
tirely unrealistic), with SMITH, supra note 33, at 157–66. 
 45 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy: The Process of Creative 
Destruction, in THE ENTREPRENEUR, CLASSIC TEXTS BY JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, supra note 26, at 
313, 316–18. 
 46 Smith & Ueda, supra note 32, at 354; see SCHUMPETER, supra note 26, at 261–83 (describing 
the role of the entrepreneur in destabilizing the economy and noting that the effect of entrepreneurial 
activity upon the industrial structure is the consequent process of reoccurring destruction and recon-
struction); see also Licht, supra note 22, at 822 (describing the circular flow of economic life as 
though the economy never reaches an equilibrium but instead shifts from disequilibrium to disequilib-
rium). 
 47 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 21, at 74–94 (discussing entrepreneurial leadership). 
 48 See id. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See infra notes 54–72 and accompanying text. 
 51 See infra notes 73–84 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 85–94 and accompanying text. 
 53 See infra notes 95–155 and accompanying text. 
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A. Novelty 
Novelty, according to Schumpeter, distinguishes the entrepreneurial activ-
ity that changes the economic order from other business undertakings.54 In his 
essay The Explanation of the Business Cycle, Schumpeter introduced the con-
cept of “new combinations.”55 These new combinations are the driving force 
that disturbs the market’s static state of equilibrium.56 He argued that the inno-
vative aspect of entrepreneurial activity is vital to the economy57 because nov-
elty and creativity challenge the current body of knowledge and eventually 
push society forward by destroying old premises.58 
Not all new combinations constitute the kind of entrepreneurship that 
leads to economic development.59 For example, Schumpeter distinguished in-
novation from invention or experimentation.60 Unless inventions are success-
fully delivered to the market, they are economically insignificant and, hence, 
do not contribute to economic development.61 It is therefore erroneous to 
equate entrepreneurship with technological invention.62 The task of the entre-
preneur is to successfully bring the invention to market, which is quite a differ-
ent undertaking than that of the inventor.63 Although, in reality, most entrepre-
neurs are also inventors or financiers, their key function is to effectively bring 
innovations to the marketplace.64 The entrepreneur, Schumpeter emphasized, 
“is the man who gets new things done and not necessarily the man who in-
                                                                                                                           
 54 Smith & Ueda, supra note 32, at 354 (“In Schumpeter’s view, the entrepreneur is the agent of 
creative destruction, and the distinguishing attribute of entrepreneurial activity is novelty.”). 
 55 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, The Explanation of the Business Cycle, in ESSAYS ON ENTREPRE-
NEURS, INNOVATIONS, BUSINESS CYCLES, AND THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITALISM, supra note 44, at 
21, 38. Schumpeter defined “new combinations” as innovations. See Becker et al., supra note 31, at 5. 
Schumpeter listed five major types of new combinations, which include: (1) a new source of raw ma-
terials, (2) a new method of production, (3) a new product, (4) a new market, and (5) a new organiza-
tion. Id. Schumpeter clarified, however, that the deployment of existing resources in an ordinary man-
ner is not a new combination. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 43, at 49–51. 
 56 SCHUMPETER, supra note 43, at 50. 
 57 Tom Bottomore, Introduction to JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DE-
MOCRACY, at ix, ix (Harper & Row 1976) (1942) (noting that Schumpeter regarded innovation as the 
essential feature of capitalism). 
 58 Id. (noting how capitalism destroys its own institutional frameworks). 
 59 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, Business Cycles: The Theory of Innovation, in THE ENTREPRENEUR, 
CLASSIC TEXTS BY JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, supra note 26, at 286, 290–93. 
 60 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 43, at 67. 
 61 See id. at 50. 
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. at 66–67. 
 64 See id. at 67. 
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vents.”65 He also identified “enterprise” as the conduit for implementing novel 
ideas and discoveries that transform economic markets.66 
Not all innovations delivered to the market, however, contribute to the 
development of the economy. Prime examples of innovations that do not de-
velop the economy are those that are carried out in response to existing market 
demand.67 To be a new combination, the innovation has to occur independently 
of the market and must create new demand.68 It is not an easy task, however, to 
trace innovation to previously non-existent market demands.69 This is especial-
ly the case because innovations are not isolated.70 They tend to cluster as more 
and more firms follow in the wake of a successful innovation.71 As the innova-
tion takes hold, it then expands to other related industries.72 
B. Value 
In the dynamic process of economic cycles, entrepreneurs innovate and 
create incremental value. Schumpeter called this incremental economic value 
“entrepreneurial profits.”73 Entrepreneurial profits can be distinguished from 
other business profits by the scope and timing of their onset.74 Entrepreneurial 
profits, according to Schumpeter, are the portion of profits over and above a 
normal profit.75 These profits follow new combinations that create new market 
demand.76 This demand in turn attracts other competitors to imitate the cutting-
edge innovation.77 As a result, Schumpeter concluded, entrepreneurial profit is 
only a temporary premium for successful innovation.78 Once competitors fol-
low, that special premium is transformed into common business profits.79 
                                                                                                                           
 65 SCHUMPETER, supra note 44, at 266. 
 66 SCHUMPETER, supra note 59, at 300. 
 67 See id. at 292–93. 
 68 Id. at 292 (“Of course the reverse would not be true: not every new plant embodies an innova-
tion; some are mere additions to the existing apparatus of an industry bearing either no relation to 
innovation or no other relation than is implied in their being built in response to an increase in demand 
ultimately traceable to the effects of innovations that have occurred elsewhere.”). 
 69 See id. at 292–300. 
 70 See id. at 298. 
 71 See id. 
 72 See id. (“[W]henever a new production function has been set up successfully and the trade 
beholds the new thing done and its major problems solved, it becomes much easier for other people to 
do the same thing and even to improve upon it. In fact, they are driven to copying it . . . .”). 
 73 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 26, at 269–73 (discussing entrepreneurial profits). 
 74 See id. 
 75 See id. 
 76 See Becker et al., supra note 31, at 5. 
 77 See id. 
 78 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 26, at 272. During the short period of time before competitors 
follow, these entrepreneurial gains also constitute monopoly gains. SCHUMPETER, supra note 44, at 
260. See generally PAUL STONEMAN, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 13–29 
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Schumpeter’s economic theory of business cycles also aligns with his 
theory of entrepreneurship. He posited that entrepreneurs, as economic agents 
who successfully deliver innovations to the market, create new demand that 
attracts other businesspersons to imitate their innovative ideas.80 At that junc-
ture, the economy starts to build an upward cycle: the result of these entrepre-
neurial profits and of the common business profits that follow is the creation of 
wealth and economic growth.81 When the innovation eventually trickles down 
to local businesses in related industries, it increases nationwide prosperity.82 
As more market players reproduce the initial entrepreneur’s success, however, 
speculation and overinvestment begin to drive down the level of profits, bring-
ing the economy into a downturn.83 Once the downturn has begun, other entre-
preneurs are required to successfully deliver new combinations to start a new 
upward business cycle, and the cycle repeats itself.84 
C. Size Doesn’t Matter 
As discussed, entrepreneurial businesses are those that stimulate the 
economy and incite market changes.85 So how do small businesses fit into this 
picture? In the past, most entrepreneurs were either self-employed or formed 
independent small firms that struggled to get capital funding.86 Yet, as Schum-
peter’s later work demonstrated, entrepreneurs are not necessarily small busi-
nessmen.87 They may be employees of large companies where constantly 
changing sets of workers proceed from one innovation to another.88 This phe-
nomenon has come to be known as “intrapreneurship.”89 By pioneering inno-
                                                                                                                           
(1983) (stressing the importance of profit making in converting an invention into an innovation and 
then into an essential product). 
 79 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 59, at 303. These premiums are temporary because no matter 
how much the entrepreneur struggles to preserve that stream of entrepreneurial profits—for example, 
by filing patent applications, imposing secrecy restrictions, or engaging in monopolistic strategies—in 
a competitive economy, innovations are destined to diffuse to other market players, related industries, 
and the entire economy, resulting in the forfeiture of the entrepreneur’s monopolistic position. See id. 
 80 See id. 
 81 See id. at 300–307. That accumulation of profits also facilitates economic and social mobility 
for the entrepreneur. See id. at 304. 
 82 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 44, at 258–63 (discussing the process of economic change). 
 83 Becker et al., supra note 31, at 5. 
 84 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 59, at 294. 
 85 Id. at 298; supra notes 54–72 and accompanying text. 
 86 See BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 104–06, 166 (describing the conditions leading to the for-
mation of small firms). 
 87 SCHUMPETER, supra note 59, at 294; SCHUMPETER, supra note 43, at 57. 
 88 SCHUMPETER, supra note 59, at 294; SCHUMPETER, supra note 43, at 57. 
 89 See generally Karina S. Christensen, Enabling Intrapreneurship: The Case of a Knowledge-
Intensive Industrial Company, 8 EUR. J. INNOVATION MGMT. 305 (2005) (examining the phenomenon 
of intrapreneurship in a large knowledge-intensive industrial firm). The term “intrapreneurship” was 
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vations within a firm’s existing structure, entrepreneur-employees contribute to 
their firm’s entrepreneurial viability.90 
Decades before intrapreneurship became a buzzword, Schumpeter pro-
posed a more nuanced understanding of entrepreneurship. In his later work, he 
argued that although entrepreneurial ventures may start small, not all small 
businesses are entrepreneurial.91 Thus, if small businesses indeed contribute to 
economic development, it is not by virtue of their size, but rather by virtue of 
their entrepreneurial character. 
In fact, Schumpeter observed, large established firms are often more en-
trepreneurial and innovative than small firms.92 This is because large firms 
have more resources to invest in innovation and to attract and incentivize en-
trepreneur-employees.93 Large firms are more devoted to innovation in their 
routine operation, he concluded, because they are more inclined to invest daily 
resources in research and development in search of the next breakthrough in-
novation.94 
D. Contemporary Thoughts on Economic Development 
Schumpeter’s ideas continue to have a large impact on contemporary eco-
nomic literature.95 Although some of his ideas have been revised and refined 
                                                                                                                           
first coined by economists in the 1980s. See generally Norman Macrae, Intrapreneurial Now, ECON-
OMIST, Apr. 1982, at 67, 68 (describing intrapreneurs). Intrapreneurship refers to divisions or employ-
ees that are responsible for developing internal entrepreneurship within large or established firms. 
Smith & Ueda, supra note 32, at 356. Up until the last decade, units that were divisions of large firms 
were excluded from the definition of entrepreneurs because it was difficult to establish their autono-
my. Arshad M. Khan & V. Manopichetwattana, Innovative and Noninnovative Small Firms: Types 
and Characteristics, 35 MGMT. SCI. 597, 599 (1989). 
 90 See Smith & Ueda, supra note 32, at 356 (observing that intrapreneurship is used by estab-
lished firms to increase novelty and avoid organizational inertia). 
 91 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 59, at 294; SCHUMPETER, supra note 43, at 57. 
 92 Becker et al., supra note 31, at 18–19. This Schumpeterian hypothesis that large firms are more 
innovative than small firms has been criticized. See William B. Gartner & Nancy M. Carter, Entre-
preneurial Behavior and Firm Organizing Processes, in ZOLTÁN J. ÁCS & DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, 
HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 195 (2003) (claiming that entrepreneurs are people 
who create new organizations, not people who innovate within the structure of already existing organ-
izations). 
 93 See Becker et al., supra note 31, at 18–19. 
 94 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 44, at 260–61. 
 95 See David E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 283, 290–91 
(2008) (“[I]t was the great Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter who made the most profound con-
tribution to the theory of entrepreneurship and to the public’s appreciation of the concept.”); see also 
NATHAN ROSENBERG, INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 106 (1982) (“[T]he 
study of technological innovation . . . consists of a series of footnotes upon Schumpeter.”). American 
economist and Nobel laureate Robert Solow, well-respected for his work on economic growth, placed 
Schumpeter’s work on economic theory among the most important of the twentieth century. Robert 
M. Solow, Heavy Thinker, NEW REPUBLIC, May 21, 2007, at 48, 51. Solow stated, “Today, some 
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over time, Schumpeter’s commitment to a vision of economics based on tech-
nological innovation has endured.96 Modern economists, most notably William 
Baumol97 and Israel Kirzner,98 among others,99 continue to develop Schumpet-
er’s theory by portraying entrepreneurship as a function of innovation and eco-
nomic evolution.100 And at least one scholar has also found no significant cor-
relation between economic growth and the size of the firm.101 
William Baumol emphasized the importance of entrepreneurship in stimu-
lating economic growth.102 Like Schumpeter, Baumol’s contribution was to 
generate a formal theoretical analysis of the entrepreneur’s role in economic 
life.103 Baumol argued that there are certain features that are crucial to growth 
in the free market.104 He singled out two features in particular: (1) innovation 
                                                                                                                           
sixty years after their deaths, Schumpeter’s star probably outshines Keynes’s.” Id. According to 
Solow, whereas “the lessons that Keynes taught have been learned by central banks and finance minis-
tries,” Schumpeter’s theory of economic growth has influenced intellectual and political leaders. Id. 
 96 See generally Elias Dinopoulos & Fuat Sener, New Directions in Schumpeterian Growth Theo-
ry, in ELGAR COMPANION TO NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS 688 (Horst Hanusch & Andreas 
Pyka eds., 2007) (applying and further developing Schumpeterian theories); NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE (Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson eds., 1986); RE-
CENT ADVANCES IN NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HORST HANUSCH 1 
(Andreas Pyka et al. eds., 2009) (same). In addition, The Economist publishes a column entitled 
“Schumpeter” to highlight the importance of his economic theory as it relates to today’s business 
trends, finance, and management. See Schumpeter: Business and Management, ECONOMIST, http://
www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter, archived at http://perma.cc/GY9D-PRDF (last visited Mar. 
31, 2014). 
 97 See generally WILLIAM BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING 
THE GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 10 (2002) (discussing innovation through a Schumpterian 
lens). 
 98 See generally KIRZNER, supra note 21 (discussing entrepreneurship); Israel M. Kirzner, Entre-
preneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach, 35 J. ECON. LIT-
ERATURE 60 (1997) (developing a theory of entrepreneurship). 
 99 See generally, e.g., RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982) (developing a theory of economic change in the intellectual tradition of 
Schumpeter); Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, The Schumpeterian Tradeoff Revisited, 72 AM. 
ECON. REV. 114 (1982) (developing a theory of economic evolution that built on and expanded 
Schumpeter’s most important ideas). 
 100 See HOWARD H. STEVENSON ET AL., NEW BUSINESS VENTURES AND THE ENTREPRENEUR 16 
(2d ed. 1985) (explaining the entrepreneurial process and describing entrepreneurship as “the process 
of creating value by pulling together a unique package of resources to exploit an opportunity”); see 
also J. Stanley Metcalfe, Entrepreneurship: An Evolutionary Perspective, in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 59, 87 (Marc Casson et al. eds., 2006) (describing entrepreneurs as 
agents that transform the economy by creating new knowledge that leads to economic evolution). 
 101 See John Haltiwanger, Entrepreneurship and Job Growth, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GROWTH, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 119, 119–45 (finding no correlation between firm size and 
employment growth and instead finding firm age as a determinant factor). 
 102 See BAUMOL, supra note 97, at 1–17 (observing how innovation and, therefore, entrepreneur-
ship in the free market creates economic growth). 
 103 See id. at viii–ix. (discussing the role entrepreneurs play in innovation and economic growth). 
 104 See id. at 1–16. 
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itself as a prime competitive weapon and (2) the entrepreneurs who devote 
themselves to productive innovation.105 Baumol relied on Schumpeter’s depic-
tion of innovation and distinguished between the innovative entrepreneur, who 
comes up with new ideas and puts them into practice, and the replicative en-
trepreneur, who simply launches a new business venture, regardless of whether 
similar ventures already exist.106 
Baumol, like Schumpeter, attributed the success of the capitalist economy 
primarily to competitive pressures not present in other types of economies.107 
These competitive pressures, he argued, are the result of oligopolistic competi-
tion among large technological firms,108 with innovation as a prime competi-
tive weapon.109 Baumol, however, distanced himself from not only Schumpet-
er110 but also economists F.M. Scherer111 and John Kenneth Galbraith.112 
Whereas Galbraith believed that the days of the individual small business en-
trepreneurs were waning,113 Baumol argued that individual small business en-
trepreneurs were responsible for revolutionary breakthroughs.114 More specifi-
cally, he pointed out that younger entrepreneurial firms are responsible for a 
disproportionate share of breakthrough inventions.115 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See id. at 4–5. 
 106 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE MICROTHEORY OF INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 26 (2010). 
 107 BAUMOL, supra note 97, at 3 (indicating that such market pressures compel firms to engage in 
“unrelenting investment in innovation”). 
 108 Id. at 4. For example, Baumol pointed to dominant firms competing in the computer industry. 
Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 31 (showing how in contrast to Schumpter’s earlier model of innovation as providing 
“extraordinary” profits to individual entrepreneurs, innovation in many industries is a product of rival 
firms who constantly innovate, thus making profits from innovation more akin to a typical investment 
in capital). 
 111 See generally F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFOR-
MANCE (1970) (providing empirical evidence that an industry is most efficient when in the hands of 
few large corporations). 
 112 See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF 
COUNTERVAILING POWER 86 (1956) (observing that the image of technological progress coming from 
individuals competing with each other is not an accurate account of the origins of innovation). 
 113 Compare ZOLTÁN J. ÁCS & DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 2 (2005) (observing Galbraith’s belief in the decline of the small business 
entrepreneur), with BAUMOL, supra note 97, at 56 (discussing the revolutionary contributions of inno-
vators outside the established firm). 
 114 BAUMOL, supra note 106, at 30–32 (observing that “[t]he degree of asymmetry in the appor-
tionment of R&D activity between large and small firms is . . . dramatic[]” and highlighting “the 
breakthrough innovations of the twentieth century—from the airplane to the zipper—for which small 
firms are responsible”). 
 115 See id. at 25 (“[T]here is a rough-and-ready division of labor between major corporations and 
small, new enterprises in the high-tech sector.” (emphasis added)). 
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Baumol identified two main classes of private suppliers of innovation: (1) 
large firms and (2) inventor-entrepreneurs.116 In this “David and Goliath” 
symbiosis, cutting-edge innovation, not pricing and economies of scale, is the 
key to success.117 In other words, entrepreneurship in small and large firms 
originates from competitive forces that drive firms to invest in innovation and 
in the rapid diffusion of technology throughout the economy. Small and large 
businesses perpetuate their existence and growth through continued innovative 
activities.118 What matters, in Baumol’s account, is not the size of the firm, but 
its innovative value.119 This entrepreneurial activity ultimately results in eco-
nomic growth.120 
Israel Kirzner also followed Schumpeter in identifying economic value in 
terms of entrepreneurial profit.121 Furthermore, Kirzner added important varia-
tions to the body of economic growth theory. He criticized price theories that 
assume perfect competition and market equilibrium.122 According to Kirzner, 
these theories create an erroneous assumption of perfect knowledge.123 When 
perfect knowledge exists in a state of equilibrium, Kirzner thought that it left 
no room for entrepreneurship.124 Opportunities for entrepreneurial profit only 
exist in disequilibrium.125 
For example, Kirzner viewed economic development as a process driven 
by entrepreneurs acting as agents responsible for equilibrating the market and 
correcting economic errors.126 Kirzner indicated that the existence of yet-
unexploited opportunities for entrepreneurial profits means that the existing 
                                                                                                                           
 116 Id. at 26. 
 117 Id. at 26, 64–66. 
 118 See BAUMOL, supra note 97, at 4. Baumol points once again to the computer industry as an 
example, where “new and improved models appear constantly, each manufacturer battling to stay 
ahead of its rivals.” Id. 
 119 See BAUMOL, supra note 106, at 26. 
 120 See BAUMOL, supra note 97, at 3–4. 
 121 See KIRZNER, supra note 33, at 26–27 (exploring the relationship among entrepreneurship, 
profit, and economic development). 
 122 See ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE DRIVING FORCE OF THE MARKET: ESSAYS IN AUSTRIAN ECO-
NOMICS 44–45 (2000) (arguing that a theory is incomplete if it assumes perfect knowledge). 
 123 See ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS 40–67 (1985). 
 124 ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, PERCEPTION, OPPORTUNITY AND PROFIT 110 (1979) (“Equilibrium 
simply means a state in which each decision correctly anticipates all other decisions. In such a situa-
tion . . . [n]o room exists for the entrepreneurial element.”). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 111 (“[The entrepreneur’s] role is created by the state of disequilibrium and his activities 
ensure a tendency toward equilibrium.”). Kirzner’s view differs from that of Schumpeter, who focused 
on the disequilibrating and destructive force of entrepreneurs. Compare id. at 109, with Smith & 
Ueda, supra note 32, at 354 (noting Schumpeter’s characterization of entrepreneurs). Kirzner instead 
argued that entrepreneurs move the economy toward equilibrium because they can identify and grasp 
opportunities ignored by others. KIRZNER, supra note 124, at 109 (“In fact, the essence of the entre-
preneurial decision consists in grasping the knowledge that might otherwise remain unexploited.”). 
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state of affairs, no matter how evenly it seems to flow, in fact is a state of dise-
quilibrium.127 Entrepreneurship, therefore, is created by a state of disequilibri-
um and ensures a tendency toward equilibrium of the economy.128 
Kirzner also refined Schumpeter’s views on innovation, putting knowledge 
at the center of his theory.129 Kirzner asserted that the market performs a cru-
cial function in discovering knowledge that nobody realizes exists.130 He 
coined the phrase “entrepreneurial alertness” to signify that when entrepre-
neurs are dissatisfied with both the quantity and the quality of current infor-
mation, that dissatisfaction inspires them to search for more and better 
knowledge.131 The market process then takes those systematically unnoticed 
opportunities and translates them into profitable exchanges.132 
American economists Zoltán J. Ács and David B. Audretsch offer a 
unique assessment of the interplay among economic growth, entrepreneurship, 
and firm size.133 Similar to Schumpeter and Kirzner, Ács and Audretsch argue 
that entrepreneurship capital exhibits a higher level of economic growth and is 
valuable to the development of the economy.134 They propose a knowledge-
spillover theory of entrepreneurship, which posits that as “knowledge context” 
increases, entrepreneurship becomes more important.135 This occurs because 
                                                                                                                           
 127 See id. at 110. 
 128 See id. 
 129 See Israel M. Kirzner, The Alert and Creative Entrepreneur: A Clarification, 32 SMALL BUS. 
ECON. 145, 148 (2009) (arguing that entrepreneurial dissatisfaction with the prevailing quality and 
quantity of information motivates entrepreneurs to discover better information, resulting in a “dynam-
ic competitive-entrepreneurial process”). 
 130 See id. at 145. Knowledge—consisting of beliefs, expectations and speculations (to the extent 
that people can base their actions upon them)—can, according to Kirzner, be new or previously ig-
nored by others. Tony Fu-Lai Yu, Entrepreneurial Alertness and Discovery, 14 REV. AUST. ECON. 47, 
51 (2001) (discussing Kirzner). Such knowledge is acquired in one of two ways, either through delib-
erate investment and cost-conscious search, or through spontaneous efforts. Id. at 50–51. 
 131 Kirzner, supra note 129, at 148. Kirzner’s work focused on how alertness drove the competi-
tive entrepreneurial process. Id. He thought that observers could best see the nature of this process by 
looking to the presence of alertness in individual decisions. Id. According to Kirzner, social institu-
tional arrangements, such as universities and research organizations, are highly desirable because they 
minimize ignorance and generate the greatest volume of spontaneous undeliberate learning. Deirdre 
Nansen McCloskey, A Kirznerian Economic History of the Modern World, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
AND THE MARKET PROCESS: IDEAS AND INFLUENCE OF ISRAEL KIRZNER 45, 56 (2010). 
 132 Fu-Lai Yu, supra note 130, at 48. Steven Klepper recently reiterated these ideas in a study on 
knowledge spillover in Silicon Valley. See Steven Klepper, Silicon Valley, a Chip off the Old Detroit 
Bloc, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GROWTH, AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 23, at 79, 79–115 (discuss-
ing spinoffs in the semiconductor industry). Klepper showed that entrepreneurs function as a conduit 
for facilitating spillover of knowledge, as they take knowledge that might otherwise have remained 
uncommercialized and use it to launch start-ups. See id. at 80. 
 133 See Ács et al., supra note 23, at 1–12 (reasserting the importance of small business). 
 134 See DAVID B. AUDRETSCH ET AL., ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (2006). 
 135 See id. at 41–43. The knowledge filter is also what creates the opportunity for entrepreneur-
ship. Id. at 42. The greater the filter, the greater the value of new ideas. See id. 
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entrepreneurship provides a missing link for economic growth by commercial-
izing investments in knowledge and ideas that might otherwise have remained 
uncommercialized. 
Unlike Schumpeter, Ács and Audretsch downplay the role of large busi-
nesses in innovation. They argue that large corporations often suffer from a 
“knowledge filter,” which they define as knowledge barriers that impede en-
trepreneurship and economic growth.136 They state that large corporations re-
peatedly decide not to pursue new ideas that eventually lead to valuable inno-
vations and, ultimately, economic growth.137 Like Kirzner, Ács and Audretsch 
claim that entrepreneurship in smaller firms contributes to economic growth by 
serving as a conduit for commercializing ideas and knowledge that otherwise 
might be abandoned or lie fallow in the organizations that originally created 
the ideas.138 
Nevertheless, Ács and Audretsch argue that firm size may not necessarily 
matter for entrepreneurship. They provide empirical data showing a mixed cor-
relation among a firm’s size, its entrepreneurial character, and its industrial 
environment.139 Indeed, U.S. Census Bureau reports illustrate that although 
most young firms are small, when size is isolated as a variable, young and en-
trepreneurial firms are in fact the engines of employment growth in the United 
                                                                                                                           
 136 Ács et al., supra note 23, at 7. Ács and Audretsch give various examples of the knowledge 
filter at work, including the copy machine, fax machine, personal computer, and flat screen. Id. at 7–8. 
According to Ács and Audretsch, “All of these ideas were caught in the knowledge filter of an incum-
bent large corporation,” so big firms failed to pursue them. Id. at 7–8. Audretsch notes that the 
knowledge filter is also what creates the opportunity for entrepreneurship. AUDRETSCH ET AL., supra 
note 134, at 42. The greater the filter, the greater the value of new ideas. See id. 
 137 Ács et al., supra note 23, at 7; accord CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DI-
LEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 86 (1997) (remarking that the 
organizational and financial structure of established companies can prevent them from investing in the 
sort of innovative technology that has the potential to disrupt the market). 
 138 Ács et al., supra note 23, at 8. Ács and Audretsch view entrepreneurship as the activity that 
leads to economic growth. See ÁCS & AUDRETSCH, supra note 113, at 1–4; accord Gartner & Carter, 
supra note 92, at 195 (noting that entrepreneurship involves the activities of individuals who create 
new organizations, not individuals who work within established firms). Ács and Audretsch argue that 
entrepreneurship is good for economic growth because entrepreneurs create new businesses. ÁCS & 
AUDRETSCH, supra note 113, at 1–4. New businesses, in turn, create jobs, intensify competition, and 
may even increase productivity through technological change. See id. 
 139 See, e.g., Zoltán J. Ács & David B. Audretsch, Innovation, Market Structure, and Firm Size, 
69 REV. ECON. & STAT. 567, 567 (1987) (finding that although large firms tend to have an advantage 
in capital-intensive, concentrated, highly unionized industries that produce a differentiated good, small 
firms tend to have the advantage in highly innovative industries that utilize a large component of 
skilled labor and tend to be composed of a relatively high proportion of large firms). See generally 
George Syrneonidis, Innovation, Firm Size and Market Structure: Schumpeterian Hypotheses and 
Some New Themes, 27 OECD ECON. STUD. 35 (1996), available at http://www.iseg.utl.pt/aula/cad
172/3.%20Bibliografia/Parte%202%20(2.2)%20G.%20SYMEONIDIS%20(1996).pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/LE3P-72R5 (providing an overview of various studies on firm size and innovation). 
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States.140 Thus, a firm’s entrepreneurial proclivity is the critical factor for eco-
nomic growth—not its size. 
Ács, in a separate essay, called for a distinction between different types of 
new businesses.141 Ács differentiated between “necessity entrepreneurship,” 
which is created because of a lack of other employment options, and “oppor-
tunity entrepreneurship,” which is an active choice to start a new enterprise 
based on the perception that an unexploited or underexploited business oppor-
tunity exists.142 He found that necessity entrepreneurship causes negative GDP 
growth, whereas opportunity entrepreneurship has a significant positive effect 
on economic development.143 A nation’s economic development, Ács conclud-
ed, depends on successful opportunity entrepreneurship combined with the 
force of established corporations.144 In sum, innovation is both a determinant 
executed by firms of all sizes and a variable that distinguishes livelihood busi-
nesses from entrepreneurial firms that can stimulate an economy.145 
Schumpeter’s vision of the key role of entrepreneurship in economic de-
velopment continues to be applied and developed today.146 The past three dec-
ades in particular have witnessed a “Schumpeterian renaissance” and a grow-
ing interest in Schumpeter’s theories.147 A neo-Schumpeterian school of eco-
                                                                                                                           
 140 Haltiwanger, supra note 101, at 119–45. 
 141 Zoltán J. Ács, How Is Entrepreneurship Good for Economic Growth?, 1 INNOVATIONS 97, 
97–98 (2006). 
 142 Id. at 97. 
 143 Id. at 97–99. 
 144 Id. at 104. 
 145 See Ács, supra note 141, at 97–99, 104; supra notes 95–144 and accompanying text; see also 
Edwin Harwood, The Sociology of Entrepreneurship, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 91, 
95 (Calvin A. Kent et al. eds., 1982) (“[W]ithout innovativeness or novelty as part of the working 
definition of entrepreneurship, the distinction between run-of-the-mill small business and new venture 
organization is difficult to justify.”). 
 146 See John Hagedoorn, Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Schumpeter Revisited, 5 INDUS. & 
CORP. CHANGE, 883, 883 (1996) (reasoning that entrepreneurial activities continue to play an active 
role in understanding innovation in Schumpeter’s theory); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and 
Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 844 (1988) (“[T]he 
Schumpeterian perspective seems well-suited for studying the legal rules . . . that influence innova-
tion.”); Pozen, supra note 95, at 283, 290–91 (“[I]t was the great Austrian economist Joseph Schum-
peter who made the most profound contribution to the theory of entrepreneurship and to the public’s 
appreciation of the concept.”). See generally Renee Prendergast, Schumpeter, Hegel and the Vision of 
Development, 30 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 253, 253 (2006) (tracing Schumpeter’s intellectual origins to 
Hegel). 
 147 See Chris Freeman, A Schumpeterian Renaissance?, in ELGAR COMPANION TO NEO-
SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS, supra note 96, at 130 passim (discussing the Schumpeterian renais-
sance); see also KIRZNER, supra note 124, at ix (observing that there has been “a remarkable resur-
gence of the Austrian tradition”). See generally John Phillimore, Schumpeter, Schumacher and the 
Greening of Technology, 13 TECH. ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC MGMT. 23 (2001) (pointing to a relation-
ship between new-Schumpeterian school of thought and Schumacher’s theory of sustainable devel-
opment). 
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nomic thought has emerged in the areas of technology and innovation stud-
ies.148 Such scholars posit that technological change is a core variable of eco-
nomic growth.149 This growth is driven by the introduction of innovation and is 
shaped by government policy.150 
Schumpeter’s work has been given its due recognition in neoclassical 
studies of economics, but it has not received similar attention in legal stud-
ies.151 Despite the fact that legal journals have often cited Schumpeter’s views 
on democracy,152 his economic schema has been overlooked by law and eco-
nomics scholars, who have tended to focus on microeconomic perspectives of 
the law.153 Nevertheless, some legal scholars have found Schumpeterian hy-
potheses useful in legal analysis.154 They argue that Schumpeterian perspec-
                                                                                                                           
 148 See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 12–14 (2008). See generally RECENT ADVANCES IN NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN 
ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HORST HANUSCH, supra note 96, at 1 (discussing neo-
Schumpeterian economics and technological innovation); Dinopoulos & Sener, supra note 96, at 688 
(noting that Schumpeter’s ideas are broad enough to allow current scholars to account for new devel-
opments in economic growth). 
 149 See Horst Hanusch & Andreas Pyka, Principles of Neo-Schumpeterian Economics, 31 CAM-
BRIDGE J. ECON. 275, 275 (2006) (“[T]echnological innovation is the most exponent and most visible 
form of novelty.”); Paul M. Romer, The Origins of Endogenous Growth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 17–21 
(1994) (explaining the role of exogenous technological change on Schumpeterian growth models); 
Horst Hanusch et al., A Neo-Schumpeterian Approach Towards Public Sector Economics 2–5 (Uni-
versitaet Augsburg, Inst. for Econ. Discussion Paper Series, Working Paper No. 306, 2009), available 
at http://ideas.repec.org/p/aug/augsbe/0306.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5GF5-CEKT. 
 150 See Hanusch & Pyka, supra note 149, at 275; Romer, supra note 149, at 17–21; Hanusch et 
al., supra note 149, at 2–5. 
 151 Merges, supra note 146, at 844. See generally Herbert Giersch, The Age of Schumpeter, 74 
AM. ECON. REV. 103 (1984) (providing an overview of Schumpeter’s influence on economics). 
 152 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
989, 1031 n.234 (2006) (“Schumpeter also argued that the content of criminal laws should not be left 
purely to politics.”); James A. Gardner, Can Party Politics Be Virtuous?, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 667, 
680 (2000) (noting that Schumpeter saw political life as a competitive struggle); Leading Cases, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 169, 272–76 (2005) (discussing Justice Clarence Thomas’s view of a Schumpeterian 
influence on how voters choose parties). 
 153 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8–22 (1976) 
(applying a microeconomic analysis to examine monopoly power); Gregory S. Crespi, Microeconom-
ics Made (Too) Easy: A Casebook Approach to Teaching Law and Economics, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
1560, 1561–74 (1993) (discussing the widespread use of microeconomic theory by law and economics 
scholars). 
 154 See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, Antitrust, Uncertainty, and Technological Innovation, 24 AN-
TITRUST BULL. 635, 644–46, 651–61 (1979) (calling for further study on the Schumpeterian hypothe-
sis regarding the ideal industrial composition for innovation); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust 
Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1823 (1984); Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nano-
technology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 629 n.121 (2005) (“I follow Schumpeter here in distinguishing 
between the act of inventing—coming up with a new idea—and innovating—turning that idea into a 
marketable product.”). 
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tives are well-suited to the study of legal rules and have called for their use in 
places where law affects innovation.155 
II. THE MODEL AS A MODERN LEGAL MIRROR 
If firm size does not matter for purposes of entrepreneurship and econom-
ic growth, why does the law support small business? This Part provides a his-
torical bridge to the reasons for the significance of small business in American 
culture today. First, Section A discusses legal “mirror theory,” the idea that law 
mirrors the society it controls.156 Section B then provides an overview of the 
history of small businesses in America and how our current understanding is 
anachronistic.157 After reviewing this history, Section C explores how small 
businesses operate in today’s economy.158 Finally, this Part asserts that legal 
rules should mirror today’s economic climate.159 
A. Mirror Theory 
Law mirrors the society it regulates.160 Mirror theory views the law as a 
human institution and a product of culture.161 Legal historian Lawrence Fried-
man further established mirror theory by describing law as a product of social 
forces.162 In his view, social pressures from interest groups,163 legal institu-
                                                                                                                           
 155 See Ginsburg, supra note 154, at 644–46, 651–61; Kaplow, supra note 154, at 1823; Lemley, 
supra note 154, at 629. See generally Merges, supra note 146, at 844–45 (“[T]his Article explicitly 
adopts a Schumpeterian framework for its analysis.”). 
 156 See infra notes 160–176 and accompanying text. 
 157 See infra notes 177–238 and accompanying text. 
 158 See infra notes 239–257 and accompanying text. 
 159 See infra notes 258–264 and accompanying text. 
 160 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 292 (2d ed. 1998). 
 161 See, e.g., CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 104–05 
(David Wallace Carrithers ed., Thomas Nugent trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1977) (1748) (noting that it 
is unlikely that law that fits one nation can suit another); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law & Society 
Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763, 764 (1986) (noting that law is a product of human culture and a 
creation of society). 
 162 FRIEDMAN, supra note 160, at 292–320; JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, 
INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA passim (2011) (reiterating 
mirror theory and describing the effects of contemporary social phenomena on the law); Book Note, 
Mirror, Mirror, On the Wall, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1813–15 (1994) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1993)) (using the narrative of Ameri-
can history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to reveal various forces that shaped the law, in-
cluding the dominant influence of social forces). But see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURIS-
PRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 12–17 (2001) (noting the problems of mirroring in formerly colo-
nized nations). 
 163 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 584 (3d ed. 2005) (“[The law] is 
whatever results from the scheming, plotting, striving, hoping, and dreaming, of people and groups, 
with and for and against and athwart each other.”). But see Mark V. Tushnet, Commentary, Perspec-
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tions, and economic conditions change the law by forcing the legal system to 
respond to them.164 Later on, Friedman added that the converse is true as 
well—society responds to the law.165 In some regards, he argued, society mir-
rors law.166 Accordingly, law not only mirrors society, but also circumscribes 
thoughts, reinforces ideology, and generates social change.167 
Legal changes, Friedman argues, derive from concrete demands on the in-
stitutions that make up the legal system.168 In the small business sphere, many 
of the legal preferences and regulatory exemptions were proposed and advo-
cated by government-appropriated small business institutions, such as the SBA 
and the House and Senate Small Business Committees.169 Created in the 1940s 
and 1950s, these institutions were instrumental in bringing about changes to 
the laws governing small business.170 These institutions conducted nationwide 
                                                                                                                           
tives on the Development of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman’s “A History of American 
Law,” 1977 WIS. L. REV. 81, 82–83 (criticizing the “materialist perspective” present in mirror theory). 
 164 Friedman, supra note 161, at 771 (“To put it another way, the main motor force of legal 
change derives from concrete demands on the institutions that make up the legal system.”); see also 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 160, at 307 (“Our concern is with law—more specifically, with the role legal 
institutions play either in helping to bring these changes about, in resisting them, in adapting to them, 
or in altering their form.”). 
 165 See Friedman, supra note 161, at 771–72. 
 166 FRIEDMAN, supra note 163, at ix (“Perhaps [law] is a distorted mirror. Perhaps in some re-
gards society mirrors law. Surely law and society interact. The central point remains: Law is the prod-
uct of social forces, working in society. If it has a life of its own, it is a narrow and restricted life.”). 
 167 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 160, at 292–320; MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES 243 (1987). 
 168 Friedman, supra note 161, at 771 (describing how legal institutions “translate [demands] into 
‘legal’ concepts”). 
 169 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 29, at 12; Greater Federal Aid to Small Businesses Urged by 
House Unit: It Backs More Defense Awards to Concerns, Legislation to Increase Investment in Them, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1963, at 13 [hereinafter Greater Federal Aid]. See generally Small Business Act 
of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, §§ 202, 204, 67 Stat. 232, 232–33 (forming the SBA to “aid, counsel, 
assist and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small business concerns”), amended by Small 
Business Act, Pub. L. No. 85-536, sec. 2, § 4, 72 Stat. 384, 384–85 (1958) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 633 (2012)) (making permanent the establishment of the SBA). 
 170 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 29, at 12; Greater Federal Aid, supra note 169; see also About, 
U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUS. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP, http://www.sbc.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?p=History, archived at http://perma.cc/H8Y5-C2GX (last visited Apr. 18, 2014) (describ-
ing the 1940 creation of the Senate Committee); Committee History, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SMALL 
BUS., http://smallbusiness.house.gov/about/, archived at http://perma.cc/NDM8-UDG7 (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2014) (describing the 1941 creation of the House Committee). One change that has occurred 
since the adoption of the SBA and the House and Senate Small Business Committees includes the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act (“RFA”), which thereafter required any agency conducting a notice and 
comment rulemaking to consider fully the rules’ effect on “small entities.” See Pub. L. No. 96-354, 
sec. 3(a), §§ 602–603, 94 Stat. 1164, 1165–67 (1981). In 1996, Congress further expanded these re-
sponsibilities by passing the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. See Pub. 
L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857. This Act gives the RFA sharper teeth by providing for judicial review 
of federal agencies’ RFA analysis. Id. § 203(2); Joshua E. Husbands, Comment, The Elusive Meaning 
of “Small Business,” 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 355, 358 (1998). 
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hearings, investigated the problems of small businesses, and translated their 
demands into laws.171 
The response to the legal system’s preferential treatment of small business 
in and of itself generated social change. This legal treatment drove business 
planning, generated economic opportunities, and encouraged small business 
owners to demand further regulatory preferences. These social changes rein-
forced the importance of small business culture in American society and in-
creased pressure on political representatives and legal institutions to favor 
small business.172 
Even though we live in an age of never-ending change, the laws govern-
ing small businesses have remained “preservationist” —entrenched in the path 
dependency of small business favoritism.173 Laws sustaining entities that 
would otherwise go out of business due to their inherent inefficiency reinforce 
this path dependency.174 At the same time, globalization and free trade oppor-
tunities have brought about significant economic and social change. Physical 
capital today is less important than knowledge capital.175 Furthermore, compe-
tition is no longer confined to the borders of domestic trade.176 The dichotomy 
of small versus big has also become irrelevant, and laws that remain fixed on 
this distinction are outdated. All told, such laws reflect neither current econom-
ic realities nor recent changes in society. 
Accordingly, to ensure that America’s laws and institutions are truly ef-
fective in promoting entrepreneurship and economic growth, our legal rules 
must target appropriate audiences and provide appropriate incentives. It is cru-
cial for any modern economy focused on growth and development to under-
stand the identity and role of key market participants. Moreover, determining 
the requirements for effective participation in the economy is key to effectively 
legislating benefits and appropriations that promote growth. 
                                                                                                                           
 171 See Greater Federal Aid, supra note 169. Consequently, small business committees were 
frequent initiators of small business acts in Congress. See, e.g., Arlen J. Large, R & D Funding for 
Small Firms Sets Off Big Fight in Congress, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1982, at 29; Senate Unit Asks 
Change in Small Business Investment Program to Make It a Success, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1960, at 6. 
See generally Friedman, supra note 161, at 771 (describing how legal institutions “translate [demands] 
into ‘legal’ concepts”). 
 172 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 29, at 16–24. 
 173 Ács et al., supra note 23, at 5; see Eyal-Cohen, supra note 29, at 16–24. 
 174 See Pierce, supra note 4, at 561–68. 
 175 Ács et al., supra note 23, at 6. 
 176 See id. at 5. For example, imported automobiles and steel are poured into the United States 
from more efficient competitors, such as Germany and Japan. Id. 
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B. A Précis of Small Business History 
The current legal focus on business size reflects an anachronistic picture 
of society. This outdated vision imagines an economy driven by mom-and-pop 
shops and local traders, with only a few dominant enterprises.177 This is an 
image of a bygone society that glorified small businesses to counteract the fear 
of big business’s influence on democracy in America.178 
Until the end of the nineteenth century, success in business meant success 
as a small business owner.179 Small firms were the norm, and typical business 
enterprises were minor, local, and personal.180 During the nineteenth century, 
rapid economic growth created opportunities for small business owners, 
whereas technological, market, and financial limitations precluded the devel-
opment of big businesses in most industries.181 Until such limitations dissipat-
ed, small firms made up the bulk of America’s business system.182 Local and 
regional commerce were the main stimuli for economic growth.183 Small busi-
nesspersons consisted of merchants, brokers, and skilled workers.184 They fa-
cilitated the exchange of goods through single-unit, non-bureaucratic enter-
prises that lacked managerial hierarchies.185 Furthermore, they sought econom-
ic gain less for themselves than for their families and their livelihood.186 Small 
business ownership was a way of life, and because the majority of businesses 
were small, firm size had no special importance.187 
The importance of firm size originated with the rise of big businesses dur-
ing the Gilded Age.188 During this period, although the number of small busi-
nesses continued to increase in absolute numbers, their significance to the 
economy began to decline.189 For example, large capital investments were re-
quired to finance new developments in transportation, communications, and 
                                                                                                                           
 177 See Carlton, supra note 4, at 656. 
 178 See id. at 655. 
 179 See BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 11 (“Getting ahead in America meant succeeding in the 
world of business, and at a time when few large firms existed, business success meant success as a 
small business person.”). 
 180 Eyal-Cohen, supra note 29, at 14–15. 
 181 See BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 13–14. 
 182 See id. at 14. 
 183 See id. at 13–14. 
 184 See id. at 15–20. 
 185 Id. at 16. 
 186 See Margaret B. Hay, Law and Social Work in a Rural Community, 145 LAW & SOC. WEL-
FARE 137, 138 (1929) (“Until recently the American population has been interested in the county 
solely as a means of livelihood and [was] concerned simply [with] having its own business succeed.”). 
 187 See BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 37–38. 
 188 See id. at 43–76. 
 189 Id. at 43. 
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manufacturing.190 This need created fertile conditions for the rise of big busi-
ness.191 Thus, management systems, bureaucratic committees, and functional 
departments began to replace informal business arrangements and employment 
based on family and personal ties.192 These new organizational entities were 
charged with the task of handling a company’s operations.193 
By the turn of the twentieth century, large companies had come to domi-
nate markets.194 They did this by taking advantage of economies of scale in 
production and by setting up their own nationwide marketing networks.195 For 
example, they used economies of scale to combine mass production with mass 
distribution.196 Mergers and vertical integration became widely used competi-
tive business practices.197 Large firms became vertically integrated enterprises 
that controlled all or most of the production and sales of their products.198 De-
velopments such as mail-order houses, department stores, and chain stores 
threatened the existence of small retail stores.199 
Some small firms adapted to these new conditions. Small businesses re-
mained significant by carving out market niches or by operating in interior 
towns that were removed from the big cities.200 They also served as producers 
during times of peak demand in industries where economies of scale did not 
exist.201 Additionally, small businesses served as suppliers of parts in second-
ary sectors, acted in seasonal markets, and operated in industries with unstable 
demand.202 
Over time, however, many small firms were unable to compete and ulti-
mately failed because they had difficulty adapting to the new economic envi-
                                                                                                                           
 190 Id. at 44–47. 
 191 See id. 
 192 BROWN ET AL., supra note 15, at 8–17. See generally id. (discussing organizational difference 
between large and small firms). 
 193 See id. 
 194 See BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 103–04.  
 195 Id. at 53. 
 196 See id. at 103–4. 
 197 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880–1960, 
95 IOWA L. REV. 863, 865–77 (2010). 
 198 Eyal-Cohen, supra note 29, at 14–15. 
 199 See Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Rem-
nants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920–1940, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1019–22 (2005) (describ-
ing the rise of threats to small retail stores). 
 200 See BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 53. 
 201 See id. 
 202 See Gideon Rosenbluth, The Trend in Concentration and Its Implications for Small Business, 
24 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 192, 197–206 (1959) (describing how small businesses have survived in 
the face of concentration in various industries). 
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ronment.203 Accordingly, public attitudes and government policies toward 
small and big businesses began to change.204 The failure of small businesses to 
match up to their larger counterparts raised substantial national concerns about 
the future of free enterprise.205 Although some associated big businesses with 
positive externalities, such as increasing wealth, efficiency in production, and a 
rise in standard of living, others feared them.206 The public began to develop a 
sentimental attachment to small businesses and the proverbial “little guy.” 
There was a desire to preserve these entities, even though many people saw 
them as anachronistic, obsolete, and inefficient.207 These critics of small busi-
nesses predicted their failure as a natural evolutionary step.208 
Social, political, and legal environments responded to the public’s chang-
ing attitudes toward small business in two ways. First, congressional policies 
began to control and regulate the operations of big businesses.209 Second, con-
                                                                                                                           
 203 BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 66 (pointing to country stores that by 1920 and 1930 disap-
peared from the scene except in isolated rural areas). For example, small companies often secured 
fewer government procurement contracts than their larger competitors, who were able to increase 
output rapidly to meet changing government demands. See Senate Small Business Committee Urges 
More Bids in Pentagon Buying, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1961, at 7; see also ADDISON W. PARRIS, THE 
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 4–18 (1968) (describing the struggles of small businesses to 
procure government contracts during the Second World War). 
 204 See BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 100. 
 205 See id. at 115. 
 206 James Surowiecki, Big Is Beautiful, NEW YORKER, Oct. 31, 2013, at 38, 38 (observing that 
consumers enjoy the greater selection of products and lower prices that big businesses offer); Barak 
Orbach, The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 605, 609–13 (2012) (“The American 
public has feared big business since businesses began utilizing economies of scope and scale.”); see 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 163, at 585 (“First, economic growth (in a society which, after all, had had a 
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money to spare, and still no inner peace. Second, big business was poisoning the rivers and darkening 
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BARONS (1934) (describing monopolistic practices used by large industrialists to control the Ameri-
can economy during the nineteenth and twentieth century). 
 207 BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 48. 
 208 Id. 
 209 See, e.g., Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 281, 69 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(2012)) (increasing penalties under the Sherman Antitrust Act); Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 
(1914) (current version in scattered sections of 15 and 29 U.S.C. (2012)) (limiting anticompetitive 
practices among firms); Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, § 2(a), 49 Stat. 1526, 1526 (1936) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 13a (2012)) (limiting price discrimination); Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.) (regulating mergers); Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 
(1975) (amending the Sherman Antitrust Act “to provide lower prices for consumers”). Note that the 
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975 was specifically designed to repeal the Miller-Tydings Fair 
Trade Act, which was an amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act that allowed for vertical pricing 
restraints. See Carole A. Casey, The Rule of Reason Analysis of Dual Distribution Systems: Does It 
Further the Purposes of the Sherman Act?, 29 B.C. L. REV. 431, 448 & n.155 (1988); Leegin’s Unex-
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gressional policies began to favor small firms.210 A small business culture ap-
peared, which glorified the significance of small firms to the American econ-
omy.211 This culture was reinforced by the institutional path dependency of 
certain small business agencies and organizations.212 These organizations, in-
cluding the House and Senate Small Business Congressional Committees and 
the SBA, proposed, advocated, and paved the path for legal rules that contrib-
uted significantly to the persistence of small business programs.213 They were 
instrumental in shaping current small business benefit patterns.214 Specifically, 
the House and Senate Small Business Congressional Committees and the SBA 
were charged with advancing the well-being and welfare of small business en-
tities.215 These institutions worked in Congress to determine which laws should 
be pursued to benefit their small business constituents.216 
 These institutions also played a major role in leading Congress down a 
path of unrelenting favoritism to small business.217 During the second half of 
the twentieth century, small business benefits proliferated throughout the tax 
code.218 Small firms were also granted regulatory exemptions from health, la-
bor, and safety guidelines.219 At the same time Congress used the law to re-
                                                                                                                           
plored “Change in Circumstance”: The Internet and Resale Price Maintenance, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
1600, 1602–03 (2008). 
 210 See BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 50, 98. For example, Congress set up the Senate Committee 
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 211 Schragger, supra note 199, at 1022–28 (describing the cultural backlash against chain stores 
and the support many felt for small retailers). 
 212 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 29, at 7–12. 
 213 Id. at 12. 
 214 See id. at 28–29.  
 215 Small Business Act, Pub. L. No. 85-536, sec. 2, §§ 2, 4, 72 Stat. 384, 384–85 (1958) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 631, 633 (2012)); see About, supra note 170 (describing the purpose of 
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(describing the purpose of the House Committee on Small Business). 
 216 See Federal Lending Plan to Very Small Firms Disclosed; 514 Loans Already Made as Test, 
WALL ST. J., May 27, 1964, at 6 (detailing the SBA’s efforts to implement pro-small business pro-
grams); Greater Federal Aid, supra note 169 (discussing how the House Committee pursued laws that 
favored small businesses); Senate Unit Asks Change in Small Business Investment Program to Make It 
a Success, supra note 171 (discussing how the Senate Committee pursued laws that favored small 
businesses). 
 217 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 29, at 12; Federal Lending Plan to Very Small Firms Disclosed; 
514 Loans Already Made as Test, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1964, at 6 (detailing the SBA’s efforts to 
implement pro-small business programs); Greater Federal Aid, supra note 169 (discussing how the 
House Committee pursued laws that favored small businesses); Senate Unit Asks Change in Small 
Business Investment Program to Make It a Success, supra note 171 (discussing how the Senate Com-
mittee pursued laws that favored small businesses). 
 218 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 2, at 1065–86 (surveying the main small business benefits). 
 219 See id. at 1072–75. 
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ward small businesses,220 legislators began to use the law to restrict big busi-
nesses, which they viewed as engaging in unfair business methods.221 This in-
cluded limiting competition, price discrimination, and other monopolistic prac-
tices.222 Accordingly, during this period, small businesses saw an increase in 
their development to some extent.223 
In the early and mid-1980s, large firms suffered and small firms contin-
ued to gain prominence. In this decade, large multinational foreign companies 
began competing with American firms in both mass production industries and 
exports to overseas markets.224 This competition led some larger firms to stag-
nate and fail.225 In contrast, small innovative firms were able to step in and 
revitalize the economy by using computers and other technological develop-
ments to their advantage.226 These firms were able to occupy market niches 
and to provide big businesses with reliable subcontracting alternatives to mass 
production.227 Furthermore, they remained an important source of innovation 
by focusing on projects requiring specialized knowledge.228 
Nevertheless, small businesses suffered from problems of their own. Alt-
hough they created more jobs, small businesses also discharged employees and 
failed at a higher rate than large firms.229 Small firms therefore were no more 
successful than larger firms in terms of net job creation.230 Nonetheless, small 
business institutions continued to advocate for small business development.231 
                                                                                                                           
 220 Indeed, Congressional members were vociferous in their support of small businesses. See 128 
CONG. REC. 9177 (1982) (statement of Sen. Samuel A. Nunn, Jr.) ( “Small business is the heart of the 
free enterprise system, that sector most likely to take the steps necessary to get this Nation back of 
[sic] the road to economic recovery.”); 124 CONG. REC. 35217 (1978) (statement of Sen. Gaylord A. 
Nelson) (“[S]mall businesses . . . are the heart and soul of the competitive free enterprise system.”); 
BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 111 (quoting one congressman who observed that “[t]here are a great 
many people who feel that if we are to preserve democracy in government, in America, we have got to 
preserve a democracy in business operation”). 
 221 See BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 111 (explaining regulatory measures restricting big busi-
ness). 
 222 See id. 
 223 See id. 
 224 See id. at 166; Ács et al., supra note 23, at 5–6. 
 225 BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 115, 119–29, 166. 
 226 See id. 
 227 Id.; see also Sanford L. Jacobs, Small Business; Small Concerns Find a Niche Solving Prob-
lems of Big Firms, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1986, at 25 (reporting that small firms find segments of the 
market big companies are not serving). 
 228 BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 115, 119–29, 166; Jacobs, supra note 227, at 25. Examples of 
these niche products include the aerosol can, biosynthetic insulin, double-knit fabrics, quick-frozen 
food, zippers, and computer software. BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 176. 
 229 See BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 178; BROWN ET AL., supra note 15, at 2–4. 
 230 Steven J. Davis et al., Small Business and Job Creation: Dissecting the Myth and Reassessing 
the Facts, 8 SMALL BUS. ECON. 297, 301–07 (1996). See generally id. (investigating how job creation 
and destruction vary by employer size). 
 231 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 29, at 19–24. 
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Their demands included increasing loan programs for small businesses and 
increasing the share of government procurement contracts awarded to small 
businesses.232 
The small business’s return to economic prominence was brief.233 Com-
panies slowly grew in size, and the rate of self-employed workers declined.234 
By the end of the 1990s, large firms had reclaimed their place in the econo-
my.235 Often, large firms drove small firms out of business by acting more effi-
ciently.236 To increase efficiency, they allowed lower-rank management more 
independence, focused on internal groups, and invested in knowledge pro-
curement and entrepreneurship.237 Large firms once again became America’s 
primary engine of economic growth.238 
C. The Economy Today 
The historical preference for small firms is a social, not economic, phe-
nomenon. This societal emphasis on firm size did not derive directly from the 
role small business played in the economy, but instead originated in response 
to the rise of big business in the early twentieth century. During the turn of the 
twentieth century, size became a significant social distinction. It differentiated 
between personal service and standardized packages, between free enterprise 
and a society of trust, and generally between what was perceived to be good 
and what was perceived to be bad.239 Today, however, the differences between 
small and large firms are less significant. Gradually, society has come to accept 
                                                                                                                           
 232 See id. 
 233 BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 166–68 (discussing the short-lived resurgence of small business 
in the 1990s). 
 234 See id. at 165–70. 
 235 Id. at 167–70. Large firms accomplished this return to prominence by using smaller manage-
ment structures and new production methods. Id. at 170. 
 236 Id. at 170–71. 
 237 The Puzzling Infirmity of America’s Small Firms, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 1995, at 63, 63; see 
BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 170. 
 238 The Puzzling Infirmity of America’s Small Firms, supra note 237, at 63; see BLACKFORD, 
supra note 4, at 170. 
 239 See 128 CONG. REC. at 9172, 9177 (1982) (statement of Sen. Samuel A. Nunn, Jr.) (“Small 
business is the heart of the free enterprise system, that sector most likely to take the steps necessary to 
get this Nation back of [sic] the road to economic recovery.”); 97 CONG. REC. 6750, 6773 (1951) 
(statement of Rep. Abraham J. Multer) (“Competition is healthy. But unfair, cutthroat competition has 
the effect of destroying competition by forcing independents out of business and leaving the field 
clear for monopoly.”); Eyal-Cohen, supra note 29, at 18–19; see also STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON MO-
NOPOLY OF THE S. SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUS., 82ND CONG., REP. TO THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION: MONOPOLISTIC PRACTICES AND SMALL BUSINESS 1–9 (Comm. Print 1952) (discussing 
the public’s perception of small business entities); Pierce, supra note 4, at 538–42 (noting that the 
myth that small is good and big is bad that is deeply rooted in our cultural beliefs is responsible for 
this phenomenon). 
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the benefits of big business and appreciate the ways large firms contribute to 
society and demonstrate corporate responsibility.240 
Moreover, the industrial and technological revolutions changed the face 
of American society. Developments in high-tech firms emphasized the im-
portance of innovation and flexibility to the success of businesses of all siz-
es.241 With the widespread availability and affordability of fast means of trans-
portation, businesses were able to locate their stores on the outskirts of town, 
where land is cheap and there is space for large parking lots.242 Furthermore, 
with the improvement of postal services, airmail, and internet access, online 
shopping became widespread.243 Geography’s impact on business accordingly 
became less significant over the last century. These developments transformed 
the United States from a land of isolated farms, shops, and towns into part of a 
worldwide market.244 In this global marketplace, increasingly more products 
can be ordered from foreign countries at lower prices, and be received within a 
few days.245 
Today, livelihood businesses mostly operate in rural and small-town 
America.246 They rely mainly on local, geographically driven demand.247 Their 
current economic role is to provide market diversity and fill market niches ig-
nored by larger businesses.248 Furthermore, they contribute to local and region-
al revitalization as well as the diversity of local goods.249  
The past several decades have illustrated that by carving out market nich-
es, continuing to be responsive to changing consumer preferences, and devel-
oping new production methods, small businesses can remain independent en-
terprises and successfully coexist with larger firms.250 Small businesses suc-
ceed by focusing on specialty products with only limited demand, securing 
nonstandardized orders overlooked by large mass-production firms, providing 
personal service, and building on their reputation.251 Some small-scale firms 
                                                                                                                           
 240 See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globaliza-
tion, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 711–17 (2002) (summarizing the way corporations demonstrate 
corporate responsibility); see also BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 93 (noting that after World War II, 
Americans looked more favorably upon big business).When asked to assess the social effects of big 
business, most Americans said that the good effects outweighed the bad. Id. 
 241 BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 165. 
 242 See id. at 66. 
 243 See id. at 184–89 (describing the rise of online book retailers). 
 244 See id. at 66, 165, 184–89. 
 245 See id. at 165–67. 
 246 Id. at 66. 
 247 See id. at 66, 119–29, 166. 
 248 See id. 
 249 See id. 
 250 See id. at 115, 119–29, 176–81. 
 251 See id. at 66, 119–29, 166. 
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are formed to act as franchised agents or subcontractors of larger firms.252 
Many such businesses fulfill a market demand created by other firms without 
much desire to change the market in which they operate.253 In contrast, other 
smaller businesses succeed and change their market by thinking “outside the 
box.”254 These firms develop new products or more efficient ways of produc-
ing existing products.255 They are usually young firms that start with a few 
employees and, when successful, become prominent in the market.256 Those 
new businesses that are able to survive the first few years after their establish-
ment do so by being entrepreneurial.257 
In the new global environment, size has become irrelevant to buyers. The 
dawn of the twenty-first century has seen internet-driven globalization redefine 
the nature of foreign trade.258 With a single click, one can communicate with 
even the most remote places in the world. The focus has shifted from size to 
technology and from a firm’s dimensions to its products’ level of sophistica-
tion.259 The fastest growing firms, whether large or small, are high-tech firms 
that develop innovative products and deliver them to the market successful-
ly.260 
Because of this global market, the significance of small businesses to the 
economy has shrunk even further.261 In the set of factors that spur economic 
growth, entrepreneurship has taken the place of size.262 Despite the widespread 
rhetoric today depicting small businesses as the source of economic growth, 
these types of entities are not responsible for the development of the econo-
my.263 Instead, economic growth is generated by the entities that, irrespective 
of their size, innovate and create value.264 
                                                                                                                           
 252 Id. at 173–74 (describing how Americans secure two goals by franchising: first, they “fulfill 
their dreams of becoming independent business people,” and second, they enjoy “the benefits of be-
longing to large supportive organizations”); Max V. Kidalov, Small Business Contracting in the Unit-
ed States and Europe: A Comparative Assessment, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 443, 497–500 (2011) (observ-
ing that some small-scale firms are formed to act as subcontractors). 
 253 See BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 173–74; Buck Brown, New Owners of Franchises Belie 
Mom-and-Pop Image, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 1988, at 11. 
 254 See BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 115, 119–29. 
 255 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 43, at 49–51. 
 256 See BAUMOL, supra note 106, at 25; BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 176–81. 
 257 See Ács et al., supra note 23, at 1–12. 
 258 See BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 184–89. 
 259 See ROBERT RONSTADT, ENTREPRENEURSHIP: TEXT, CASES AND NOTES 28–31 (1984) (noting 
that some scholars believe that technological innovation is the only true entrepreneurship). 
 260 Timothy Bresnahan & Alfonso Gambardella, Introduction to BUILDING HIGH-TECH CLUS-
TERS: SILICON VALLEY AND BEYOND 1, 1 (Timothy Bresnahan & Alfonso Gambardella eds., 2004). 
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 263 See id. 
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III. A FIVE-DIMENSIONAL LEGAL MODEL OF ECONOMIC 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Thus far, this Article has illustrated that, both historically and economi-
cally, the importance of small business to economic development has been ex-
aggerated.265 This Article now seeks to provide an alternative model of eco-
nomic development. Part III applies the main elements of economic develop-
ment theory—namely, innovation and economic value—to the legal landscape. 
It seeks to shift the focus from firm size to entrepreneurship. Furthermore, it 
prescribes a multidimensional legal model that reflects an economy no longer 
driven by small or large businesses, but by innovative businesses. This new 
model replaces firm size with a more flexible and graduated distinction. 
Many policymakers today are focused on finding the actual determinants, 
effects, and spillovers of entrepreneurship in the hope of fostering economic 
growth.266 With this legislative intent in mind, Part III offers a conceptual 
model for measuring entrepreneurial viability. The model builds on Schumpet-
er, Baumol, and Kirzner’s entrepreneurship theories as well as on other modern 
economic notions of entrepreneurship. Given the many dimensions of entre-
preneurship, identifying a single indicator that measures entrepreneurship may 
result in an arbitrary and skewed picture.267 As a result, this model presents a 
menu of the main and widely accepted common features and measures of for-
profit firms that are most likely to display entrepreneurial qualities: (1) firm’s 
age, (2) knowledge procurement, (3) innovation yield, (4) labor expansion, and 
(5) entrepreneurial success. 
This selection of variables is based on principles of methodological 
soundness, simplicity, administrability, and measurability. Furthermore, this 
selection takes into account the overall relationship of these factors to the con-
cept of entrepreneurship. It is possible that, if examined separately, the chosen 
factors would not exclusively indicate entrepreneurial proclivity. Rather, it is 
the combination of these factors that provides a composite portrait of a firm’s 
entrepreneurial inclination.268 Moreover, the factors chosen here make this 
                                                                                                                           
 265 See supra notes 85–264 and accompanying text. 
 266 See HARPER, supra note 22, at 2; Carree & Thurik, supra note 22, at 437; Licht, supra note 22, 
at 817; see also Wennekers & Thurik, supra note 22, passim (surveying the literature associating en-
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 267 See Diego B. Avanzini, Designing Composite Entrepreneurship Indicators, in ENTREPRE-
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model more accurate and more efficient than the current small-or-not model by 
better circumscribing the entrepreneurial phenomenon, which is truly at the 
heart of economic growth and development. In the current economic reality, 
innovation is a greater indicator of entrepreneurship than firm size. 
The proposed model also derives strength from its focus on the most 
common entrepreneurial behaviors of firms, as opposed to individual entrepre-
neurs. Over the past several decades, a vast amount has been written on the 
individual characteristics of entrepreneurs, particularly from a psychological 
perspective.269 This scholarship has generally portrayed entrepreneurs as spe-
cial individuals who tend to exhibit a particular combination of attributes, in-
cluding risk-taking, which enables them to assume the role of innovators in the 
economy.270 Nevertheless, a firm-behavior model of entrepreneurship has a 
number of advantages over other models that focus on the traits of individual 
entrepreneurs. First, studies have not established a causal relationship between 
individual traits and entrepreneurial success.271 Actions, rather than psycholog-
ical attributes, give meaning to the entrepreneurial process.272 Second, entre-
preneurial effectiveness manifests itself at the firm level, not the individual 
level, and is easier to measure in terms of firm, rather than individual perfor-
mance. Third, although an individual entrepreneur’s qualities may affect an 
organization’s actions, it is the collection of individuals’ acts manifested in the 
                                                                                                                           
cator, better represents different dimensions of a concept because it allows the model to take into 
account multiple facets of a phenomenon. See id. 
 269 See, e.g., Becker et al., supra note 31, at 16 (describing the entrepreneurial spirit); Licht, supra 
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 270 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
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firm’s market performance that ultimately produces organizational achieve-
ments.273 
A. Firm’s Age 
Although hardly a perfect predictor, many economists consider firm age 
as a general factor in gauging entrepreneurship.274 Ács and Audretsch argued 
that entrepreneurship entails the creation of new enterprises.275 In Schumpet-
er’s eyes, a new organization is yet another form of a new combination.276 And 
Baumol acknowledged the fact that novel ideas are often, though not always, 
embodied in new firms.277 
Whether new firms are entrepreneurial depends upon their ability to con-
vert original ideas into success.278 Accordingly, the connection between a 
firm’s age and its entrepreneurial character is a functional return. In other 
words, innovation is frequently manifested by the creation of a new formal 
organization. This is because of the firm’s role as an instrument for accruing 
entrepreneurial profit.279 The enterprise is simply a modern conduit through 
which entrepreneurial ideas enter the market.280 It is advantageous for the en-
trepreneur to establish a separate legal entity to facilitate the accounting of en-
trepreneurial activity, receive credit and finance the development of innova-
tions, and achieve legal autonomy.281 
Of course, not all new firms innovate and succeed, but entrepreneurial 
failure is just as important as entrepreneurial success.282 Both are economically 
and culturally valuable and productive.283 Entrepreneurial failure diffuses 
knowledge among competitive entrepreneurs and emphasizes the skill sets that 
                                                                                                                           
 273 See Licht, supra note 22, at 832. 
 274 See infra notes 275–296 and accompanying text. And importantly, new firms are not neces-
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 275 ÁCS & AUDRETSCH, supra note 113, at 1–4. 
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 277 See BAUMOL, supra note 106, at 25. 
 278 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 59, at 293–96. 
 279 Id. at 304–6. 
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 281 See id. at 234. 
 282 See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON 
VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 111–15 (1994) (arguing that learning from failure increases the competi-
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 283 See id. 
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entrepreneurs need to be resilient and eventually successful.284 Failure edu-
cates investors and allows them to choose their future investments more wise-
ly.285 Furthermore, failure introduces “churn” into labor markets, which even-
tually leads to greater economic growth.286 
Today, in fact, scholars view the mere act of creating new organizations as 
the essence of entrepreneurship.287 The creation of new ventures or new de-
partments in existing firms is seen as an indication of emergent entrepreneur-
ship and novelty.288 Scholars perceive new organizations as the way that entre-
preneurs produce new combinations by successfully transforming resources 
into final goods.289 With the development of limited liability doctrines that pro-
tect entrepreneurs from the risk of personal liability for their entities’ defaults, 
forming new entities has become an ordinary first step in the establishment of 
an entrepreneurial venture.290 
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aversion by entrepreneurs, particularly given the inability of such investors to diversify); Lynn M. 
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Leading entrepreneurship studies on organizational demography focus on 
business age and support the assertion that the creation of new firms is linked 
with entrepreneurship.291 For example, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(“GEM”) project292 reports entrepreneurial activity by computing nascent en-
trepreneurship, which includes only firms that are less than 3.5 years old.293 
Similarly, the Kauffman Foundation294 releases the Kauffman Index of Entre-
preneurial Activity, “a leading indicator of new business creation in the United 
States.”295 
Nevertheless, focusing solely on firm age as an indicator of entrepreneur-
ship provides an incomplete picture. For example, studies that focus on a 
firm’s age ignore, to some extent, the phenomenon of intrapreneurship. Recall 
that intrapreneurship occurs when established firms have employees or de-
partments that continuously seek innovation and are entrepreneurial in their 
character.296 The model proposed here provides a more complete analysis by 
considering other indicators and denoting different grades of entrepreneurial 
behavior. It recognizes that firm age, in and of itself, is insufficient in predict-
ing innovation. 
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B. Knowledge Procurement 
Innovation generally refers to the creation of superior products,297 tech-
nologies,298 or processes.299 Schumpeter viewed innovation as the way of de-
livering new goods, new methods of production, new markets, new sources of 
raw materials, and the carrying out of new organizations of industries.300 Alt-
hough innovation is usually associated with technological changes, it may oc-
cur in nontechnological fields.301 In these industries, firms can innovate by 
improving access to existing products and customer needs and by making 
products more attractive.302 
Scholars have expressed skepticism over the existence of a method that is 
capable of fully measuring all dimensions of firms’ innovation.303 Neverthe-
less, measurements of innovation often begin by assessing a firm’s knowledge 
procurement.304 One method of measuring a firm’s investment in knowledge is 
                                                                                                                           
 297 See David M. Gann & Ammon J. Salter, Innovation in Project-Based, Service-Enhanced 
Firms: The Construction of Complex Products and Systems, 29 RES. POL’Y 955, 955–57 (2000) (link-
ing innovation to the creation of more technologically complex products and systems). 
 298 See Michael L. Tushman et al., Technology Cycles, Innovation Streams, and Ambidextrous 
Organizations: Organization Renewal Through Innovation Streams and Strategic Change, in MAN-
AGING STRATEGIC INNOVATION AND CHANGE: A COLLECTION OF READINGS 3, 5–7 (Michael L. 
Tushman & Phillip C. Anderson eds., 1997) (discussing the relationship between innovation and tech-
nology). 
 299 See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 137, at ix–xiii (giving an example of Sears innovating through 
new processes by developing supply chain management, catalogue retailing, credit card sales, and 
store brands). See generally THOMAS H. DAVENPORT, PROCESS INNOVATION: REENGINEERING 
WORK THROUGH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 1–20 (1993) (defining process innovation as im-
provements in business processes and giving examples of such innovations). 
 300 Becker et al., supra note 31, at 25. 
 301 See Keith Smith, Measuring Innovation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION 148, 
168–70 (Jan Fagerberg et al. eds., 2005); see also Dominique Guellec & Bill Pattinson, Innovation 
Surveys: Lessons from OECD Countries’ Experiences, 27 SCI. TECH. INDUS. REV. 77, 89 (2001) (dis-
cussing how innovation arises from sources other than technological development). 
 302 See Steven H. Hobbs, Toward a Theory of Law and Entrepreneurship, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 241, 
276–81 (1997) (describing innovation as enhancing the value of a product or a service even through non-
technological means). See generally Khan & Manopichetwattana, supra note 89, at 597–98 (describing 
how as firms grow, their focus shifts from innovative products to innovative processes). 
 303 See Jan Fagerberg, Innovation: A Guide to the Literature, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INNOVATION, supra note 301, at 1, 1–8 (noting difficulties in measuring and quantifying innovation). 
 304 One method of measuring knowledge procurement proposed by economists is the “linear in-
novation” model, which begins with research and development of scientific knowledge and later de-
velops into technological models and practical engineering. See Rinaldo Evangelista et al., Measuring 
Innovation in European Industry, 5 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 311, 312, 317–32 (1998) (explaining the 
linear model and then statistically measuring innovation); cf. Matthew R. Marvel & G.T. Lumpkin, 
Technology Entrepreneurs’ Human Capital and Its Effects on Innovation Radicalness, 31 ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 807, 807–08 (2007) (examining a scientific body of work and then the 
practical developments following from that scientific body). 
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by focusing on the cost of its innovation input.305 This cost includes, but is not 
limited to, research and development (“R&D”) expenditures, external acquisi-
tions of knowledge, the acquisition of equipment that incorporates new tech-
nology when producing a new product, as well as other tools and staff train-
ing.306 
This Article’s proposed model determines knowledge procurement as fol-
lows: 
 
(P) Knowledge Procurement (year i)  = 
Innovation Input i 
         Sales i 
 
Investment in knowledge and innovation incorporates a wide array of in-
puts, such as cost of information, human capital, designs, tools, and labs. Here, 
the indicator proposed by this Article consists of funds invested in knowledge 
procurement as a percentage of the company’s sales.307 This indicator provides 
information on the firm’s level of commitment to innovation as shown by its 
willingness to devote a portion of its sales to innovation. 
The model proposed here suggests incorporating a wide array of outlays 
to indicate investment in knowledge as an objective criterion.308 Today, in both 
popular and academic literature, innovation efforts are viewed as a proxy for 
                                                                                                                           
 305 The Internal Revenue Code provides a research and development (“R&D”) tax credit for cer-
tain qualified expenditures on R&D, namely amounts paid for the performance of research in the 
pursuit of new scientific knowledge. 26 U.S.C. § 41(a)–(b), (e) (2012). These expenditures usually 
include the wages of employees engaged in performing, supervising, or supporting R&D; supplies, 
prototypes, testing materials, and any tangible property directly linked to R&D activities; payments 
for R&D services performed under contracts; and basic research payments to nonprofit organizations 
and institutions for performing fundamental research that focuses on evaluating theories and hypothe-
ses. Id. § 41(b)(2)(C)–(D), (e). 
 306 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES IN 
THE U.S. ECONOMY 91 (Lawrence D. Brown et al. eds., 2004), available at http://www.nap.edu/
catalog.php?record_id=11111, archived at http://perma.cc/H36N-ZC6C. External acquisition of 
knowledge can come in the form of patents, licenses, and technical services. Id. 
 307 Investment in innovation has also been measured as a firm’s “R&D intensity,” calculated by 
identifying average R&D expenditures as a percentage of total sales. See Wesley M. Cohen & Steven 
Klepper, The Anatomy of Industry R&D Intensity Distributions, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 773, 773–80 
(1992) (analyzing the nature of the distribution of firm R&D intensities within industries); Otto Toi-
vanen et al., Innovation and Market Value of UK Firms, 1989–1995, 64 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & 
STAT. 39, 41 (2002); see also Richard Blundell et al., Market Share, Market Value, and Innovation in 
a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 529, 530–31, 547 (1999) (using R&D 
expenditure as a factor in measuring knowledge). See generally Toivanen et al., supra, at 41 (describ-
ing R&D expenditures as intangible assets and the stock of innovative knowledge). 
 308 For a discussion on how firms vary with regard to R&D as an outlay, see Cohen & Klepper, 
supra note 307, at 773–80 (analyzing the nature of the distribution of firm R&D intensities within 
industries). 
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the long-term growth of firms, industries, and nations.309 Such efforts signify 
the firm’s commitment to producing knowledge and new ideas, which, if suc-
cessful, result in innovation output.310 These innovation efforts also indicate 
the amount of financial resources that a firm devotes to the development of 
innovation, thereby demonstrating the firm’s commitment to entrepreneur-
ship.311 
Still, investment in knowledge alone is not sufficient for attaining eco-
nomic growth.312 Entrepreneurship involves the act of successfully transform-
ing innovation into business value.313 For example, a firm may be able to 
achieve a breakthrough invention, but then fail in commercializing that innova-
tion and converting it into economic value. As noted by Kirzner, entrepreneuri-
al firms are those that achieve innovation by pursuing opportunities and 
knowledge ignored by others.314 
C. Innovation Yield 
Investment in innovation involves the combination of inputs in the hope 
of attaining positive outputs.315 Innovation outcomes are a key part of econom-
ic development theory; they illustrate the importance successful innovative 
processes have in creating economic value.316 
There are many different ways to measure innovation output. The most 
common signals of innovation outcomes are a firm’s intellectual products. 
                                                                                                                           
 309 See Samuel B. Graves & Nan S. Langowitz, R&D Productivity: A Global Multi-Industry 
Comparison, 53 TECH. FORECASTING SOC. CHANGE 125, 125 (1996) (“R&D spending seems to be 
critical to corporate success.”); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATISTICAL REPORT: ANNUAL LINE 
OF BUSINESS REPORT 1977, at 19–22 (1985) (showing firm-financed R&D as a percentage of sales for 
the ten highest-valued industry categories and showing its importance to firm prosperity). 
 310 See supra notes 54–72 and accompanying text (discussing how entrepreneurial firms create 
novelty). 
 311 See Cohen & Klepper, supra note 307, at 775–80 (looking at data on R&D expenditures and 
sales and transfers to see where firms focused their efforts to procure knowledge); cf. CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, PUB. NO. 2589, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 9–12 
(2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-
drugr-d.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H8T7-5GXX (using R&D expenditures to measure a firm’s 
commitment to innovation). 
 312 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 59, at 290–93 (noting that not all new combinations constitute 
the kind of entrepreneurship that leads to economic development). 
 313 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 43, at 67 (distinguishing economic leadership from invention, 
and noting that “inventions are economically irrelevant” if “they are not carried into practice”). 
 314 KIRZNER, supra note 124, at 109 (“In fact, the essence of the entrepreneurial decision consists 
in grasping the knowledge that might otherwise remain unexploited.”). 
 315 ALEXANDRA STONE ET AL., SCI. & TECH. POLICY INST., MEASURING INNOVATION AND IN-
TANGIBLES: A BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE, at II-1 to -2 (2008). 
 316 STONE ET AL., supra note 315, at II-2; see Lewis M. Branscomb, Improving R&D Productivity: 
The Federal Role, 222 SCI. 133, 133 (1983) (arguing that federal investment in bringing innovation to the 
private sector would boost the economy). 
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These include patents, copyrights, licenses, trademarks, service marks, product 
designs, trail productions, and publications.317 Many studies measure the 
productivity of innovation and a firm’s ability to generate new knowledge by 
the number of patents, copyrights, and trademarks it introduces.318 Other stud-
ies use bibliometric information, such as the number of scientific publications, 
books, research and grant proposals, presentations, and cite counts.319 
These studies, however, fail to account for the quality of innovation.320 A 
firm’s R&D department may be extremely productive when measured by the 
quantity of patents obtained, but may still fail to yield successful innovations 
or to further the company’s business goals.321 Similarly, an invention can be 
considered scientifically groundbreaking by outside evaluators and journal edi-
torial boards, but in reality have little or no commercial value.322 Moreover, 
some firms today are “patent trolls” that purchase patents as a strategic way to 
                                                                                                                           
 317 See Wesley M. Cohen & Steven Klepper, A Reprise of Size and R&D, 106 ECON. J. 925, 929 
(1996) (measuring the number of patents and innovations as products of R&D investment); see also 
David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in the 
Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1684–86, 1695–98 (2007) (examining the general 
trends in biotechnology intellectual property, including patent counts, patent-ownership patterns, and 
the distribution of biotechnology patents across distinct areas of research and development). 
 318 See, e.g., Mark G. Brown & Raynold A. Svenson, Measuring R&D Productivity, 41 RES. 
TECH. MGMT. 30, 31–33 (1998) (using the number of patents received to measure productivity); Ariel 
Pakes & Zvi Griliches, Patents and R&D at the Firm Level: A First Look, in R&D, PATENTS AND 
PRODUCTIVITY 55, 63–65 (Zvi Griliches ed., 1984), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/
c10044, archived at http://perma.cc/LY6W-L3NV (considering the number of patent applications as 
an accurate proxy for innovation). 
 319 See Zoltán J. Ács & David B. Audretsch, Innovation in Large and Small Firms: An Empirical 
Analysis, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 678, 678–81 (1988) (measuring innovative output as the number of new 
product innovations reported in trade journals in 1982). 
 320 See, e.g., Zvi Griliches, Patents: Recent Trends & Puzzles, BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIV-
ITY, 1989, at 291, 314 (arguing that patent counts do not inform us about the quality of patents); Keith 
Smith, Science, Technology and Innovation Indicators—An Overview of the Issues, in SCIENCE, 
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION INDICATORS—A GUIDE FOR POLICY-MAKERS 1, 6 (Keith Smith ed., 
1998) available at http://survey.nifu.no/step/old/Projectarea/IDEA/Idea5.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/3RAZ-PEJ4 (observing that patent studies do not provide much information about the eco-
nomic value of innovations and that bibliometric data is a flawed method of measuring scientific in-
novation because it provides no information about the innovation process, but instead focuses on pub-
lication statistics). See generally Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the 
Market and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 
67–68, 122 & n.29 (2006) (arguing that the loose practices of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
lead to the issuance of low quality patents). 
 321 See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results 
of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1296–1302, 1312–14 (2009) 
(showing that a key motive of patenting by startups is to find investors, not to innovate). 
 322 For example, academic articles or cultural inventions can include innovations that advance our 
understanding of processes and certain behaviors and yet have no commercial value. See Allan Han-
son, The Making of the Maori: Culture Invention & Its Logic, 91 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 890, 897–99 
(1989) (discussing how academics create new ideas that, although culturally significant, have no 
commercial value). 
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block potential competitors.323 Accordingly, simply counting output is not 
enough. Outcomes must be measured by considering the real value an innova-
tion adds to the firm. 
A useful alternative indicator is innovation yield. Innovation yield consid-
ers the quality of an investment in knowledge and the value of that investment 
to the firm. This measure indicates the effectiveness of a firm’s innovation ef-
forts by determining the relationship between the commercial value of 
knowledge and the investment required to generate that knowledge.324 By cap-
turing the successful implementation of that knowledge, innovation yield di-
rectly measures the success of the knowledge’s commercialization—in other 
words, the essence of the entrepreneurial process.325 
Innovation yield can be illustrated as follows: 
 
(Y) Innovation Yield (year i)  = 
Innovation output i 
 Innovation input i 
 
There are various ways to measure return on investment in innovation.326 
A simple way to measure the return is by looking at the ratio of innovation 
                                                                                                                           
 323 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1991, 2008–10, 2044 (2007) (arguing that “patent trolls,” i.e., entities that do not innovate but 
instead buy and assert patents in court, impede innovation); James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic 
Patenting of Complex Technologies 6 n.6 (Research on Innovation, Working Paper No. 0401, 2003), 
available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/roi/wpaper/0401.html, archived at http://perma.cc/68GQ-SKLT 
(“[Firms] may choose to patent alternative techniques in order to strategically block competitors.”). 
Other firms patent the same product multiple times, creating “patent thickets that harm innovation.” 
Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 864 (2007) 
(claiming that patent thickets are especially harmful in innovation settings). 
 324 Cf. Samuel B. Graves & Nan S. Langowitz, Innovative Productivity and Returns to Scale in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 14 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 593, 593–96, 599–604 (1993) (examining six 
years of R&D expenditures as a primary independent variable for innovation). See generally Steven 
M. Paul et al., How to Improve R&D Productivity: The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Grand Challenge, 
9 NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 203, 203–13 (2010) (analyzing the R&D productivity of new medi-
cines). 
 325 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 59, at 290–93. This is why companies demand that their em-
ployees not only produce innovations, but also establish the value of these innovations to the organi-
zation. Cf. Brown & Svenson, supra note 318, at 30 (“Upper management is becoming less content 
with subjective measures of R&D’s contribution to the bottom line.”). 
 326 See Ville Ojanen & Olli Vuola, Categorizing the Measures and Evaluation Methods of R&D 
Performance—A State-of-the-art Review on R&D Performance Analysis 1–20 (Telecom Bus. Re-
search Ctr. Lappeenranta, Working Paper No. 16, 2003) (providing a review of the literature on meas-
uring innovation effectiveness). A number of scholars, for example, have compared the growth of 
research stock within different firms. See, e.g., Michael E. McGrath & Michael N. Romeri, From 
Experience: The R&D Effectiveness Index: A Metric for Product Development Performance, 11 J. 
PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 213, 213–20 (1994); M. Ishaq Nadiri, Innovations and Technological 
Spillovers 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4423, 1993), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w4423.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6GM3-XRJG.  
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output to innovation inputthat is, the revenues directly derived from invest-
ment in innovation as a portion of the cost of that innovation.327 Whereas in-
vestment in knowledge includes patents, information, and salaries, innovation 
output includes any commercial value generated by new patents, products, 
processes, or publications.328 Accordingly, innovation yield captures the effec-
tiveness of investment in knowledge by measuring the profits firms directly 
derive from it. 
When novelty is created, a firm may realize a low innovation yield ratio. 
This signifies a higher investment in innovation in the early stages of devel-
opment. Once the investment is successfully developed into the innovation 
product, a firm may begin to reap more innovation output in the form of entre-
preneurial gains, and, consequently, its innovation yield ratio increases.329 As 
more competitors enter the market, however, the innovation output is expected 
to decrease, which in turn would cause the innovation yield ratio to decline as 
well.330 
D. Labor Expansion 
Entrepreneurial firms are considered the biggest contributors to the na-
tion’s economic growth.331 Entrepreneurs establish new firms, which create 
more competition and new jobs.332 This rapid labor expansion drives high lev-
els of economic growth.333 Innovation, in particular, contributes to this labor 
expansion and economic growth. Once a firm successfully implements an in-
novation, the firm initiates mass production by expanding its workforce.334 
This process generates long-term employment and economic growth.335 
                                                                                                                           
 327 See Evangelista et al., supra note 304, at 316. 
 328 See Brown & Svenson, supra note 318, at 31. 
 329 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 26, at 269–73.  
 330 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 59, at 303. 
 331 Ács, supra note 141, at 103 n.15 (“The major generators of employment growth are both new 
plants and new firms . . . .”). 
 332 See id. at 101. New firms may also make the economy more productive by bringing about new 
technologies. Id. at 104.  
 333 Id. at 97. 
 334 See ZOLTÁN J. ÁCS & CATHERINE ARMINGTON, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GEOGRAPHY, AND 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 16 (2006) (linking employment growth to the creation of new firms); 
Per Davidsson et al., Entrepreneurship as Growth; Growth as Entrepreneurship, in ENTREPRENEUR-
SHIP AND THE GROWTH OF FIRMS 21, 33–35 (Per Davidsson et al. eds., 2006) (discussing the relation-
ship between entrepreneurial success and workforce growth); Zoltán J. Ács et al., The Missing Link: 
The Knowledge Filter and Entrepreneurship in Endogenous Growth 17–21 (Centre for Econ. Policy 
Research Discussion Papers, Working Paper No. 4783, 2004), available at http://www. 
indiana.edu/ ~idsspea/papers/ISSN%2005-12.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TVD3-BAJA. 
 335 Cf. Erik Brouwer et al., Employment Growth and Innovation at the Firm Level—An Empirical 
Study, 3 J. EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 153, 153–59 (1993) (finding that firms with a high share of prod-
uct-related R&D experienced an above average growth of employment). 
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Labor expansion is only one of many indicators of entrepreneurship and 
innovation. Although labor expansion is one of the most recognized positive 
effects of entrepreneurship, it measures only the quantity, not the quality or 
productivity of employment in a firm. Labor expansion does not tell us any-
thing about the turnover rate of employment, or more specifically, how many 
employees who joined a firm subsequently left during the course of the period 
in question.336 Thus, as with the other indicators, employment growth alone 
cannot describe the entrepreneurial character of a firm. It must be combined 
with other factors to determine a firm’s entrepreneurial orientation. 
This Article’s proposed model describes labor expansion with the follow-
ing formula: 
 
(E) Labor Expansion (year i) = 
 ∆E/E  
t 
= 
  (Ei - E i-t) / Ei-t 
           t  
  E= Number of employees 
 
There are many approaches for calculating labor expansion.337 To miti-
gate the growth biases of very small, closely held corporations—which add 
only a few employees over a short period time—the model should be limited to 
include only those enterprises with greater than a certain number of employ-
ees.338 Finally, for the sake of simplicity, the model proposes to measure labor 
expansion by focusing on the firm’s periodic net increase in the number of full-
time employees.339 
                                                                                                                           
 336 See Paul M. Muchinsky & Paula C. Morrow, A Multidisciplinary Model of Voluntary Employ-
ee Turnover, 17 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 263, 263 (1980) (positing that voluntary turnover depends on 
characteristics of the individual employee, work-related factors, and the states of certain economic 
variables). 
 337 See, e.g., STEVEN J. DAVIS ET AL., JOB CREATION AND DESTRUCTION 188–91 (1996) (provid-
ing a series of formulas for measuring net job creation); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
EUROSTAT-OECD MANUAL ON BUSINESS DEMOGRAPHY STATISTICS 47–48 (2007), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/std/39974460.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GA5L-KZWX (measuring eco-
nomic development by the growth in the number of jobs per enterprise over time); Zoltán J. Ács & 
Catherine Armington, Employment Growth and Entrepreneurial Activity in Cities, 38 REGIONAL 
STUD. 911, 921 (2004) (measuring average annual employment growth rate in year srt+1 as (empl 
srt+1/empl srt)
1/3 – 1); Brouwer et al., supra note 335, at 154 (measuring annual growth rate of em-
ployment by using fifth root of the increase in employment: EMP(t)/EMP(t-5)]
1/5 – 1); Steven J. Davis 
& John Haltiwanger, Gross Job Creation, Gross Job Destruction and Employment Reallocation, 107 
Q. J. ECON. 819, 825–29 (1992) (providing a method for calculating job creation and destruction by 
measuring establishment size, sector size, and growth rate). 
 338 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 337, at 61 (setting a size threshold to 
prevent the growth of small enterprises from causing distortions). Nevertheless, this threshold should 
be set low enough to avoid excluding too many enterprises, especially newly formed corporations in 
their nascent stages. 
 339 Cf. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 337, at 41, 61 (discussing how full-
time employee data can be used to measure labor expansion); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & 
 
2014] Legal Mirrors of Entrepreneurship 761 
E. Entrepreneurial Success 
When a firm invests its resources in knowledge procurement and success-
fully implements that innovation in the market, the market creates a demand 
for the firm’s products.340 At that moment, the firm experiences a rapid growth 
in economic activity.341 There are many indicators of an increase in economic 
activity. These indicators include a rise in the firm’s income levels, growth in 
the number of employees, an increase in sales, an increase in international 
trade, a surge in the return-on-assets ratio, and growth in the number and capi-
talization of enterprises in the stock market.342 
To remain simple, the model proposed here seeks to use measures that are 
both accessible and manageable to firms and policymakers. Growth in sales is 
a well-recognized indicator of a firm’s success, and is fairly easy for the firm 
and its investors to observe.343 Sales are also the immediate indicator of chang-
es in market demand for a firm’s products.344 When a firm makes an important 
discovery and invests in product development, the successful delivery of a 
product to the market is primarily demonstrated through a sharp increase in a 
sales growth.345 Accordingly, growth in sales can convey entrepreneurial suc-
                                                                                                                           
DEV., MEASURING ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A COLLECTION OF INDICATORS 28 (2009) (focusing on 
periodic growth in employees in firms with ten or more employees). 
 340 See supra notes 59–72 and accompanying text (describing how entrepreneurship spurs innova-
tion and grows the economy).  
 341 See supra notes 59–72 and accompanying text. 
 342 See Avanzini, supra note 267, at 39–40 (providing such examples as ways to measure growth 
in economic activity). 
 343 See, e.g., David Schwarzman, The Growth of Sales Per Man-Hour in Retail Trade 1929–1963, 
in PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SERVICE INDUSTRIES 201, 201–18 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 
1963), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1203.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8EFS-3DXK 
(measuring the growth of constant-dollar sales per man-hour in retail trade between 1929 and 1963); 
John Williamson, Profit, Growth and Sales Maximization, 33 ECONOMICA 1, 1–3 (1966) (building on 
Baumol’s growth model and constructing a model that measures the differences in firm behavior driv-
en by sales maximization). But see Gregory G. Dess & Richard B. Robinson, Jr., Measuring Organi-
zational Performance in the Absence of Objective Measures: The Case of the Privately-Held Firm and 
Conglomerate Business Unit, 5 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 265, 265–66 (1984) (arguing that there are often 
problems obtaining objective measures of selected aspects of organizational performance that are 
reliable and valid, such as return on assets and growth in sales). 
 344 See, e.g., Rajshree Agarwal & Barry L. Bayus, The Market Evolution and Sales Takeoff of 
Product Innovations, 48 MGMT. SCI. 1024, 1025 (2002) (discussing the relationship between sales and 
increased market demand); Richard Schmalensee, Another Look at Market Power, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
1789, 1793–96 (1982) (analyzing the connection between increased market power, market demand, 
and sales). 
 345 See David J. Bryce & Jeffrey H. Dyer, Strategies to Crack Well-Guarded Markets, 85 HARV. 
BUS. REV., May 2007, at 84, 90 (providing empirical data on the connection between firm entry into 
new markets and change in average annual sales). 
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cess because it signals a firm’s ability to convert valuable knowledge into in-
creased economic performance.346  
The proposed model describes entrepreneurial success through the fol-
lowing formula: 
 
(S) Entrepreneurial Success (year i) = 
∆S/S = 
(Si - S i-t) / E i-t 
          t t 
 S=Sales 
 
Entrepreneurial success is a multidimensional phenomenon that may be 
comprised of many indicators that provide information on business expan-
sion.347 These indicators include, among others, growth in sales, equity, in-
come, and assets. Out of these indicators, the proposed model uses average 
annual growth rate based on sales because studies have concluded that sales 
growth is a reliable indicator of innovation.348 This measure estimates the suc-
cess of the firm’s products through increases in the firm’s sales volume over a 
period of time, under the assumption that the more successful the firm is in 
implementing innovation and creating new market demand, the higher the 
sales of its innovative products in the market.349 
Although entrepreneurial success yields economic wealth derived from 
sales, this wealth is typically a temporary monopoly position.350 It only exists 
until competitors that imitate the entrepreneur’s innovation enter the market.351 
Once imitators enter the market and begin to sell similar products, the original 
firm will witness a decrease in sales.352 This decrease reflects the market’s re-
action to the rise in the variety of products.353 
Finally, despite being a useful proxy, identifiable sales increases cannot 
alone evidence entrepreneurial gains. Sales can also expand when firms fulfill 
preexisting market demand or utilize new marketing techniques. This problem 
therefore emphasizes the benefits of a model that uses a combination of fac-
                                                                                                                           
 346 See ALEX COAD, THE GROWTH OF FIRMS: A SURVEY OF THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVI-
DENCE 77–81 (2009) (describing the relationship between innovation and sales growth). 
 347 Id. at 69. 
 348 See, e.g., id. at 73 (finding that firms appear to increase their total R&D expenditure following 
growth in sales and growth of employment); Alexander Coad & Rekha Rao, Firm Growth and R&D 
Expenditure, 19 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 127, 127–28 (2010); Alexander Coad & Rekha 
Rao, Innovation and Firm Growth in High-Tech Sectors: A Quintile Regression Approach, 37 RES. 
POL’Y 633, 633 (2008) (relating innovation to sales growth for incumbent firms in high-tech sectors). 
 349 Cf. Bryce & Dyer, supra note 345, at 86–90 (discussing a study on profitable firms between 
1990 and 2000 and calculating growth rate as the change in average annual sales). 
 350 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 44, at 260. 
 351 See id. 
 352 See id. 
 353 See id. 
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tors. The use of many factors creates a more comprehensive picture of a firm’s 
entrepreneurial orientation. 
F. The Model 
The five-dimensional conceptual model of entrepreneurship outlined 
above should be designed in accord with the following strategies. First, to 
achieve a better fit between the firm’s actions and its entrepreneurial character, 
the model should be graduated.354 Each dimension of entrepreneurship must 
contain several levels of entrepreneurial activity. Second, for the sake of sim-
plicity, the model should focus on the most generally recognized and easily 
measured dimensions of entrepreneurship. To this end, though, the model may 
be expanded to include other entrepreneurial dimensions to attain an even 
more refined picture of entrepreneurial activity. Third, the use of multiple di-
mensions, and multiple layers within those dimensions, should introduce 
greater elasticity. This elasticity allows firms to move from one tier to another 
within each indicator. Finally, the proposed model should integrate the five 
individual dimensions into a single composite index.355 Every tier in the model 
should provide firms with a number of points per entrepreneurial dimension, 
and each dimension should be weighted differently to account for its relative 
importance to economic development and social policies. 
Figure 1, below, is an illustration of this model: 
 
Figure 1: Entrepreneurial Orientation Scale 
 
Points per 
indicator 
A 
Firm’s 
Age 
P 
Knowledge 
Procurement 
Y 
Innovation 
Yield 
E 
Labor 
Expansion 
S 
Entrepreneurial 
Success 
100 A ≤α1 P ≥β1 Y ≥γ1 E ≥δ1 S ≥ε1 
80 α1> A ≤α2 β1> P ≥β2 γ1> Y ≥γ2 δ1> E ≥δ2 ε1> S ≥ ε2 
60 α2> A ≤α3 β2> P ≥β3 γ2> Y ≥γ3 δ2> E ≥ δ3 ε2> S ≥ ε3 
40 α3> A ≤α4 β3> P ≥β4 γ3> Y ≥ γ4 δ3> E ≥ δ4 ε3> S ≥ ε4 
20 α4> A ≤α5 β4> P ≥β5 γ4> Y ≥ γ5 δ4> E ≥ δ5 ε4> S ≥ ε5 
                                                                                                                           
 354 On the connection between a progressive schedule and accurate representation of economic 
activity, see, for example, Robert P. Inman, Comments to Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Lifetime Incidence 
of State and Local Taxes: Measuring Changes During the 1980s, in TAX PROGRESSIVITY AND IN-
COME INEQUALITY 89, 89 (Joel Slemrod, ed., 1994) (explaining how graduated tax schedules help 
societies efficiently allocate resources); Michael L. Robertsi & Peggy A. Hite, Progressive Taxation, 
Fairness, and Compliance, 16 L. & POL’Y 27, 27–30, 34 (1994) (discussing fairness and graduated 
measures in tax systems). But see James M. Snyder & Gerald H. Kramer, Fairness, Self-Interest, and 
the Politics of the Progressive Income Tax, 36 J. PUB. ECON. 197, 197 (1988) (contending that mar-
ginal-rate progression is not the result of society’s desire to achieve a fairer distribution of income but 
is instead the result of middle-income taxpayers wanting to reduce their own burden). 
 355 Cf. SAISANA & TARANTOLA, supra note 268, at 6 (explaining the benefits of composite indi-
cators); Avanzini, supra note 267, at 43 (explaining how composite indicators are able to efficiently 
use multiple factors to acquire knowledge). 
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Figure 1: Entrepreneurial Orientation Scale 
Weight per 
indicator 0.1 0.25 0.3 0.20 0.15 
* α, β, γ, δ, ε represent constant numbers in each range. 
** Points and weight per indicator are a random suggestion and can be adjusted to 
correlate to policy, industry, and other preferences. 
 
In every tier in the model, the firm receives a distinct number of points 
per entrepreneurial dimension. In Figure 1, for the purpose of simplicity, the 
scale increases in equal twenty-point increments. Every entrepreneurial dimen-
sion is also allotted a different weight. For example, Figure 1 provides an illus-
tration of random weight suggestions, which emphasize investment in 
knowledge over other entrepreneurial dimensions. The composite indicator 
works by multiplying the sum of points of each indicator by the weight of each 
entrepreneurial dimension to add up to the firm’s entrepreneurial orientation 
index. 
Firms located at the top end of the scale receive a higher index, denoting 
their stronger entrepreneurial orientation and greater proclivity to contribute to 
economic growth. On the other hand, firms that receive no score at all are con-
sidered trivial, non-entrepreneurial enterprises. As firms move up the scale, 
they attain a higher entrepreneurial index. 
The following examples of three hypothetical firms illustrate the model in 
action. First, consider Orange, Inc., a successful telecommunication company 
established in 1977. Orange enjoys steady employment expansion and invests 
some efforts in innovation, but mainly reaps profits from previously developed 
products. Under the new model, Orange will be deemed a relatively entrepre-
neurial-oriented firm, but the firm’s age and its rather low innovation efforts 
prevent it from receiving a higher index. Alternatively, consider Newco, Inc., a 
software company founded just three years ago. It invests most of its resources 
into R&D, has doubled its number of employees, has successfully sold its 
products to several clients, and has significantly increased its sales over the last 
few years. Under the proposed model, Newco undoubtedly will be considered 
predominantly entrepreneurial. As a third example, consider Pizza, Inc., a local 
family pizzeria. It has been in business for twenty years, yields a stable aver-
age annual sales rate, does not significantly change its number of employees, 
and always uses the same baking method. Under the proposed model, Pizza 
will not be considered entrepreneurial. 
Although this multi-dimensional model is far from flawless, it is certainly 
an improvement over the current small-or-not standard. A single indicator can-
not alone capture complex outcomes. Accordingly, the model should be 
viewed as a starting point for further studies of entrepreneurial traits and their 
correlation to economic growth. In the future, as studies on economic growth 
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establish correlations to other firm behavior indicators, the model should in-
corporate these gauges to attain a better reflection of our society. 
IV. POLICY AND CRITICISM 
By now, it is clear that rewarding firms merely according to their size will 
not necessarily achieve economic development. The size-focused approach is 
inconsistent with the current economic and social landscape. It reflects an 
anachronistic picture of previous economic structures.356 An entrepreneurship-
focused approach, on the other hand, directly correlates to economic develop-
ment. Such an approach harmonizes modern-day economic policy and goals 
with the law. Accordingly, continuing to focus on firm size in legal definitions 
does not fit current economic realities and, more problematically, misses the 
point of entrepreneurship. 
This Part first demonstrates how this Article’s proposed model is more ef-
ficient in identifying firms with entrepreneurial orientation than the size-
focused standards currently dominant in our legal system.357 It then illustrates 
the model’s benefits through an examination of tax laws.358 Finally, it de-
scribes and addresses some possible criticisms of the proposed model.359 
A. A Flexible, Fair, and Administrable Model 
Legal tax models are more likely to be implemented successfully when 
they are designed with three main objectives in mind: flexibility, fairness, and 
administrability.360 The proposed five-dimensional conceptual model of entre-
preneurship in the law aspires to achieve these three goals. First, the proposed 
model is flexible. It includes several levels for each indicator.361 Firms are 
likely to move from one tier to another each year.362 Next, the model is fair. 
This fairness flows from the combination of five factors and five tiers, allow-
ing for a more graduated and unbiased representation of firms’ various degrees 
of entrepreneurship.363 Lastly, the five-dimensional conceptual model is simple 
and administrable. It focuses on only five widely accepted gauges of entrepre-
                                                                                                                           
 356 See supra notes 85–94, 177–238 and accompanying text. 
 357 See infra notes 360–368 and accompanying text. 
 358 See infra notes 369–382 and accompanying text. 
 359 See infra notes 383–388 and accompanying text. 
 360 See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Individual Tax Reform for Fairness and Simplicity: Let Economic 
Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 459, 463–67, 482, 489 (1993) (discussing the tax 
system’s concerns with fairness, simplicity, and administrability). 
 361 See generally supra notes 265–356 and accompanying text (describing the proposed model at 
length). 
 362 See generally supra notes 265–356 and accompanying text. 
 363 See generally supra notes 265–356 and accompanying text. 
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neurship. These measures are simple to attain, easy to measure, and broadly 
accessible to firms and policymakers. This simplicity and accessibility makes 
the determination of firms’ entrepreneurial orientation relatively straightfor-
ward. 
Importantly, the model also accounts for the temporary nature of entre-
preneurship.364 No firm or person is ever entrepreneurial all the time.365 Behav-
ior and growth trends will vary from firm to firm and from one year to another. 
This model accommodates these variances by allowing both for different stag-
es of entrepreneurial activity and for several levels within each entrepreneurial 
dimension. 
This model also attains flexibility while maintaining fairness and admin-
istrability by using a composite indicator.366 The proposed model integrates the 
mathematical combination of each individual indicator into a single index. 
This method allows for the incorporation of a multi-dimensional concept of 
entrepreneurship.367 It also provides policymakers and individual managers 
with a method of comparing different companies’ entrepreneurial orientations 
as well as greater predictability to firms that are changing their position in the 
market. Finally, the composite indicator can assist policymakers in anticipating 
future entrepreneurial conditions and trends.368 
Another feature of the proposed model that contributes to its flexibility is 
the allowance for a distinct weight to be given to each indicator. This provides 
an additional way to account for the significance of each entrepreneurial fea-
ture. Each indicator should be weighted differently according to its contribu-
tion to entrepreneurship, industrial variance, public and social policy, and other 
economic factors. For example, some indicators may demonstrate a stronger 
correlation to entrepreneurship and economic growth than others. 
Specifically, there are a number of considerations that policymakers may 
take into account when adjusting each indicator’s corresponding weight. They 
should consider existing empirical studies and ensure that the factors reflect 
national entrepreneurial trends and policies. Furthermore, the weight of each 
entrepreneurial dimension may be adjusted to account for the structure of vari-
                                                                                                                           
 364 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 43, at 60 (stating that being an entrepreneur is not a lasting con-
dition). 
 365 See id. 
 366 Cf. SAISANA & TARANTOLA, supra note 268, at 5 (explaining the benefits of composite indi-
cators). 
 367 See COAD, supra note 346, at 69 (noting that the multi-dimensional nature of entrepreneurship 
cannot be captured by any single indicator). 
 368 Avanzini, supra note 267, at 42 (suggesting that composite indicator models can provide poli-
cymakers with information about the direction of developments, comparisons between different situa-
tions, assessment of current trends, early warnings, identification of areas for action, and anticipation 
of future conditions). 
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ous industries; the model should adapt to different national contexts and differ-
ent structures of the business population. Finally, policymakers may also use 
this model to reflect nationwide priorities. For example, in years that the gov-
ernment is more interested in increasing employment, it may give a greater 
weight to the entrepreneurial dimensions that have a higher correlation to job 
creation—such as employment expansion or longevity—and correspondingly 
reduce the weight of other indicators. Alternatively, if our policy objective is 
productivity growth, allotting greater weight to indicators of growth and ex-
pansion may be appropriate. 
The proposed legal model’s elasticity adds greater fairness to the applica-
tion of the law to businesses. It allows firms to move along the entrepreneur-
ship scale as they become more or less entrepreneurial oriented. When law-
makers incorporate this model into each area of the law, they will be free to 
adjust it fairly. Although there is not necessarily a correlation between entre-
preneurship and each individual characteristic, they provide a valuable signal 
as a composite group. When a firm’s state of affairs changes, it alters its posi-
tion on the scale accordingly. This elasticity is beneficial in preventing the 
proposed model from either understating or overstating a particular firm’s en-
trepreneurial orientation. 
B. Several Illustrations of the Model 
One of the major advantages of the proposed model is its graduated na-
ture. This means the model has the ability to take into account more economic 
variations than the classic small-or-not dichotomy. Indeed, size has proven to 
be an inadequate indicator of the kind of entrepreneurial activity that creates 
value and advances the economy.369 In contrast to the current discrete and arbi-
trary size-based taxonomy, this multi-factor, multi-tiered, composite model 
aims to identify firms that possess entrepreneurial characteristics or firms that 
are becoming entrepreneurial. Once the truly entrepreneurial firms have been 
identified, the proposed model allows them to receive certain benefits. 
Examining the tax incentives granted to small-business investors provides 
one example of how the model may improve fairness, promote simplicity, and 
increase administrability. The tax code offers significant tax benefits to indi-
viduals who operate or own stock in small firms.370 For example, enacted in 
1993, I.R.C. § 1202 allows noncorporate taxpayers to exclude gains from the 
                                                                                                                           
 369 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 2, at 1086–96; Pierce, supra note 4, at 551–55. 
 370 See David O. Kahn, Tax Tips: A Qualified Small Business Stock Tax Primer, L.A. LAW., Dec. 
2000, at 17, 18 (noting that the legislative intent behind these benefits was to encourage investment in 
small high-tech startup companies); Husbands, supra note 170, at 368–69. 
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sale or exchange of qualified small business stock from taxable income.371 The 
legislative purpose of laws such as I.R.C. § 1202 is to promote entrepreneur-
ship by encouraging financiers to invest in innovative firms.372 But small firms 
are not necessarily entrepreneurial.373  
In contrast, this Article’s proposed model could better identify and pro-
mote entrepreneurial firms. For example, § 1202 could be redesigned to allow 
a full exclusion for gains resulting from the sale or exchange of stocks in firms 
with a high entrepreneurial orientation index. These are the highly innovative, 
job-creating, high-growth firms that currently or potentially promote economic 
growth. In addition, an exclusion of a reduced percentage could be accordingly 
granted to firms with a lower entrepreneurial orientation index. Finally, this tax 
benefit would be denied altogether to firms with an entrepreneurial orientation 
below a certain level, regardless of their size. 
Comparable tax benefits, such as those provided by I.R.C. §§ 1045 and 
1244, could also be improved through the application of the proposed model. 
Section 1045 permits taxpayers to rollover capital gains on the sale of small 
business stock if the proceeds are reinvested in another qualifying small busi-
ness stock.374 The legislative purpose of this provision is to encourage entre-
preneurship by pushing the effective tax rates of certain investments down to 
zero if all proceeds are reinvested in similar qualified investments.375 Section 
1244 treats losses incurred by the sale of a small business corporation’s stock 
                                                                                                                           
 371 I.R.C. § 1202 (2012). Individuals who own qualified small business stock for at least five 
years can exclude up to 50% of the capital gain on disposition, limited to the greater of (1) $10 mil-
lion, reduced by any previously excluded gain attributable to such issuer, or (2) ten times the aggre-
gate adjusted basis of the qualified small business stock disposed of in the taxable year at issue. Id. 
§ 1202(a)(1), (b)(1). The tax code defines a qualified small business stock as that of a C corporation 
with less than $50 million in aggregate gross assets. Id. § 1202(d). The C corporation has to be active-
ly engaged in trade or business with less than $50 million in aggregate total assets before and immedi-
ately following the issuance of the stock. Id. § 1202(c)(1), (d)(1)(B). 
 372 See Kahn, supra note 370, at 18; Husbands, supra note 170, at 368–69. It is a well-known fact 
that securing credit is important in facilitating entrepreneurship. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 60, at 
234. Entrepreneurs without capital require financing to gain commercial value from their innovations. 
See id. 
 373 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 2, at 1086–99 (providing a general discussion on the overinclu-
siveness of small business preferences). In 2008, the Internal Revenue Service data demonstrated that 
99% of all firms report $50 million or less in assets and that their investors may therefore be eligible 
for this exclusion. See I.R.C. § 1202(c), (d) (defining small business and providing an exclusion for 
investments in small business stock); SOI Tax Stats—Corporation Source Book Statistical Tables 
2008 (All Sectors), supra note 11. 
 374 I.R.C. § 1045 (2012). 
 375 Cf. Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-ups, 57 
TAX L. REV. 137, 165–67 (2003) (remarking that § 1405 “is an extension of § 1202[,]” which was 
“designed to encourage long-term investment in small businesses[,]” and observing that under certain 
circumstances, § 1405 incentivizes such investments by causing effective tax rates to approach zero). 
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as ordinary losses instead of capital losses.376 This treatment results in bigger 
write-offs for investors in small business stock.377 There is a greater chance, 
however, that these tax provisions will accomplish their goals and spur eco-
nomic growth if they incentivize investments in entrepreneurial firms rather 
than small firms. If Congress instead modifies this benefit to allow a scaled tax 
benefit according to a firm’s entrepreneurial orientation, it could achieve a bet-
ter fit between these legal rules and their policies. 
Finally, the proposed model could improve the R&D tax credit. The cur-
rent R&D credit provides a general tax credit equal to 20% of qualifying re-
search expenses in excess of a base amount; however, the tax credit covers 
100% of qualified research expenses for eligible small firms.378 The tax code 
defines an eligible small business as a business in which the taxpayer does not 
own a 50% or greater interest and in which there are five hundred or fewer 
employees.379 Once again, this preference is currently available to an overly 
broad segment of the market.380 
The same graduated scheme discussed above could be implemented more 
effectively under the proposed model as well. The R&D credit could be de-
signed to allow 100% credit for qualified research expenses in firms with a 
high entrepreneurial orientation index. It could then provide lower credit per-
centages to firms with lower entrepreneurial orientation indices. Providing 
these benefits gradually in accordance with the firm’s entrepreneurial orienta-
tion will promote innovation while reducing complexity and compliance costs 
associated with inconsistency in current definitions in the law.381 Applying the 
proposed model will also result in a more effective allocation of government 
resources.382 
                                                                                                                           
 376 I.R.C. § 1244 (2012). A “small business corporation” is a corporation whose aggregate re-
ceipts of money and property—in exchange for and at the time of issuance of corporate stock—does 
not exceed one million dollars. Id. § 1244(c)(3). 
 377 Id. § 1244(a).  
 378 Id. § 41(a) (2012) (providing for a general tax credit); id. § 41(b)(3)(D)(i) (providing a tax 
credit peculiar to eligible small firms). 
 379 Id. § 41(b)(3)(D)(ii). 
 380 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FAQ, supra note 6, at 1 (noting that small businesses make up 
99.7% of U.S. employer firms and that in 2010, only 18,500 firms were not small businesses). 
 381 See generally STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 95TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
REVENUE ACT OF 1978, at 195 (Comm. Print 1979) (explaining that many small business firms do not 
reap the full benefits they are entitled to because they are not familiar with the myriad aspects of the 
code and because they do not get adequate advice on how to meet the various definitions of a small 
business). 
 382 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 2, at 1095–96 (illustrating that size-based models contribute to the 
misallocation of government resources). 
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C. Defusing Potential Criticism 
There are three main types of potential objections to the proposed model: 
(1) disapproval of the choice of indicators, (2) the lack of prospective gauges, 
and (3) potential manipulation of the new model. First, finance scholars may 
object to the group of indicators chosen for this project. Specifically, they may 
question the lack of measurements of financial performance or risk-taking, 
such as investment capital, profits, return on assets, and debt-to-equity ratio. 
These measurements, however, were not ignored in the design of the model. 
Rather, they were carefully considered and rejected. These measurements were 
all found to possess one common problem: an inability to characterize univer-
sally recognized entrepreneurial behavior.383 Entrepreneurial risk is hard to 
measure, and encouraging risk-taking can produce speculation. Also, economic 
development theory provides no support for their inclusion. 
Today, there are many potential indicators of entrepreneurship. Many of 
these indicators are expressed through the use of innovation in daily life. But 
not every positive spillover of innovation is an indicator of entrepreneurship. 
These spillovers are not exclusive to economic growth. They may appear as 
improvements in quality of life, social progress, and the standard of living. 
Similarly, entrepreneurship is valuable for the benefits it generates to individu-
als and other entities in the same industry or in related markets.384 Neverthe-
less, observations of spillovers, quality of life, and social development are 
speculative, subjective, and difficult to capture. 
Second, one might point to the fact that some of the entrepreneurial di-
mensions reward entrepreneurial entities ex post and not ex ante. In other 
words, it may seem unjust to reward successful entrepreneurial entities that 
already demonstrate a high entrepreneurial character rather than incentivize the 
struggling firms that are in greatest need of government support to pursue such 
activity. 
The model, however, achieves both ends. It allows legislators to target 
those firms that have already proven to have a high innovation yield. It also 
recognizes new firms that are in the initial stage of knowledge procurement 
and have not yet reaped the fruits of innovation. The model not only allows 
firms that have already expanded their labor force to receive a higher entrepre-
neurial index, but it also assists young firms on their way up and managers in 
predicting and calculating the increase in their labor force required to reach 
                                                                                                                           
 383 See Avanzini, supra note 267, at 39 (arguing that entrepreneurship variables should be select-
ed on the basis of their analytical soundness, measurability, relevance to the phenomenon being meas-
ured, and relationship to each other). 
 384 See Klepper, supra note 132, at 79–117 (discussing how the interplay between entrepreneurial 
firms in a small region creates innovation and increases economic growth). 
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that mark. Additionally, as mentioned above, the weight granted to each entre-
preneurial dimension can be adjusted to account for the importance policy-
makers may wish to give to ex post or ex ante incentives. 
A final potential critique of the proposed model may target its potential 
for manipulation and evasion. Simplicity comes with a price.385 It is not practi-
cable to integrate multiple variables that will meaningfully capture the phe-
nomenon of entrepreneurship while at the same time eliminate manipulation of 
the system altogether. Overinflating data, however, also comes with a price, 
which will help to deter firms from engaging in such a practice. The interrela-
tion of this model with other legal reporting obligations should affect a firm’s 
liability.386 For example, the deployment of mergers and acquisitions or the 
creation of new entities for the sole purpose of receiving a higher entrepreneur-
ial orientation score will likely affect the firm’s financial and securities fil-
ing.387 Overinflating sales or employee numbers will surely have an effect on 
increasing the firm’s tax liability.388 Policymakers can deal with these concerns 
about manipulation when designing their approach to applying the proposed 
model. 
CONCLUSION 
The law should not favor small businesses in the name of entrepreneur-
ship. There may be other valid reasons for assisting brick-and-mortar entities. 
In a different article I discuss how supporting trivial businesses promotes vari-
ous moral and social goals, including benefitting disadvantaged populations of 
minorities, whose main access to livelihood and financial autonomy is small 
business ownership.389 Furthermore, acknowledging the importance of liveli-
                                                                                                                           
 385 Cf. James Alm, What Is an “Optimal” Tax System?, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 117, 117–18 (1996) 
(arguing that there is no framework that is able to capture all of the incredible complexity that charac-
terizes the real world); Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can 
Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 151, 156 (1998) (arguing that the desire for fair-
ness and certainty causes tax complexity). See generally, e.g., Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, 
Reform, and the Illusions of Tax Simplification, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 319, 334–52 (1994) 
(providing a historical account of attempts to balance tax complexity and tax simplicity); Peter H. 
Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (1992) (dis-
cussing the need to balance simplicity and complexity in our legal system). 
 386 See generally I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 45R, 1401 (2012) (detailing reporting requirements in the tax 
code). 
 387 See generally Gil B. Manzon, Jr. & George A. Plesko, The Relation Between Financial and 
Tax Reporting Measures of Income, 55 TAX L. REV. 175, 176, 212 (2002) (discussing filing require-
ments). 
 388 Cf. Manzon & Plesko, supra note 387, at 190 (showing how overestimation of firm income 
can increase a firm’s tax liability). 
 389 Eyal-Cohen, supra note 35; see also Government Minority Small Business Programs: Hearing 
Before Subcomm. on Minority Small Bus. Enter. of the H. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 92d Cong. 351 
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hood businesses, and attending to their high compliance costs and tight credit 
problems, helps preserve cultural objectives such as maintaining business di-
versity.390 Third, because these businesses operate neighborhood shops in ur-
ban areas or small stores in the countryside, they are often vital to local culture 
and diversity.391 Nevertheless, law should not favor small businesses simply 
due to their size. Anachronistic societal sentiments as well as a fear of big 
business’s influence on democracy originally inspired these laws. Over time, 
however, these sentiments have changed. Size-centered laws are now outdated. 
And because law is a product of society, it should reflect how society and the 
economy have changed over time. 
We live in a century characterized by rapid social change. Every aspect of 
life—society, technology, politics, and the economy—is very different from 
where it stood a mere decade ago. The dichotomy of small versus big is irrele-
vant today. Instead, the entrepreneurial nature of a business is more important. 
This reflects the ability of a business to innovate and successfully deliver in-
novation to the market. Laws that remain fixed on the small versus big distinc-
tion are therefore obsolete. 
This Article’s proposed model for capturing entrepreneurial activity could 
improve the law in a variety of ways. First, it defines the legal frontiers of en-
trepreneurship by injecting the economic theory of entrepreneurship into the 
law itself. Second, it uses economic history to harmonize the law with the so-
ciety it mirrors by identifying the practical elements of firms that promote 
novelty. Third, the model provides policymakers with more accurate tools to 
recognize and encourage innovative firms that have the potential to improve 
the economy. Lastly, it presents a more efficient way to meet budgetary goals 
while promoting economic growth. It does this by focusing on those entrepre-
neurial entities that have a higher likelihood of adding value to the economy. 
More broadly, however, this Article scrutinizes the design of certain legal 
rules by considering their intent and the role of law in a changing society. 
Whether Congress should even use the law to direct behavior is hotly debated 
                                                                                                                           
(1972) (statement of Calvin L. Walton, National Director, Independent Truckers League, Inc.) (argu-
ing that opening one’s own business is the best way for minorities to avoid systemic discrimination in 
hiring); SMALL BUS. ADMIN., MINORITIES IN BUSINESS: A DEMOGRAPHIC REVIEW OF MINORITY 
BUSINESS OWNERSHIP, 8–9 (2007), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs298tot.pdf, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/PB8N-HR7U (illustrating that minority-owned firms are more likely to be 
small businesses than white-owned firms). But cf. Pierce, supra note 4, at 537, 558 (arguing that small 
businesses are responsible for more cases of discrimination). See generally CHARLES V. DALE, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL33284, MINORITY CONTRACTING AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR DISADVAN-
TAGED SMALL BUSINESSES: LEGAL ISSUES (2006) (advancing small business as a mechanism to ad-
vance minorities). 
 390 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 29, at 13 (discussing the positive cultural views of small busi-
ness). 
 391 See BLACKFORD, supra note 4, at 66. 
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and certainly beyond the scope of this Article. Regardless, lawyers and legal 
scholars have a central role in alerting the legislature and compelling the legal 
system to adjust and to accord for far-reaching changes in social and economic 
condition. Such efforts will ensure that legal rules actually mirror society and 
continue, at least in this Article’s context, to promote innovation, encourage 
economic development, and ultimately lead to greater prosperity for all. 
 
  
 
